Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal
Volume 12
Number 1 Winter 2020

Article 5

Fall 2020

Katz and Covid-19 How a Pandemic Changed the Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy
Wayne Unger

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_science_technology_law_journal
Part of the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wayne Unger, Katz and Covid-19 How a Pandemic Changed the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 12
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 40 (2020).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_science_technology_law_journal/vol12/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC
Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

KATZ AND COVID-19: HOW A PANDEMIC
CHANGED THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
by WAYNE UNGER*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract..............................................................................................................................40
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................41
II. The COVID-19 Surveillance Technologies ..................................................................43
III. The Current Legal Standards and Jurisprudence .........................................................57
A. Fourth Amendment, Statutory, and State Constitutional Protections ......................57
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard ...........................................................61
C. The Shift in the Privacy Expectations and Reasonableness .....................................68
IV. A Case Study: The Pandemic’s Effect on the Law .....................................................71
V. The Ineffectiveness and Unworkability of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Standard and Reclaiming The Right to Privacy ................................................................78
A. The Ineffective and Unworkable Katz Standard ......................................................78
B. Reclaiming the Right to Privacy with a New Legal Standard and Legislative Action
.......................................................................................................................................79
Conclusion .........................................................................................................................82

*

J.D., Arizona State university, Sandra Day O’Connor College of the Law, 2020.

40

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:1]

ABSTRACT
COVID-19 spread to 189 countries and infected tens of millions of people in the matter
of months. Organizations, including governments and employers, turned to health
surveillance technologies to slow the spread and combat the disease. Protected health
information and personal information are required for the proper and effective functioning
of the health surveillance technologies. The collection, use, and dissemination of protected
health and personal information raised data privacy and security concerns. But under the
current data privacy and security regime—based on the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard—protected health and personal information is not protected to the extent that it
needs to be.
Unlike other scholarly work, this article presents deeper analysis into the
technologies, the data that powers them, and the applicable legal standards. The objective
is to provide a better understanding of (i) the data privacy and security risks, and (ii)
whether the current data privacy and security regime in the United States provides
sufficient protections for individuals.
This article explores two health surveillance technologies (contact tracing applications
and health monitoring platforms), presents three categories of data (user-inputted, queried,
and autogenerated data), and describes the data supply chains that power technology and
organizations. I discuss the benefits and risks of collecting the protected health and
personal information in response to the pandemic. I explore the current legal standards and
jurisprudence, and I propose the Privacy Continuum to explain how the pandemic shifted
the reasonable expectation of privacy. I present a case study to synthesize the foregoing,
and I conclude by proposing a new legal standard—the right to control—and other reforms
to effectuate true data privacy and security protections. Only then can we reclaim our right
to privacy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) declared the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) outbreak a “public health emergency of
international concern,” and shortly thereafter, the WHO declared the outbreak a global
pandemic.1 On March 13, 2020, the President of the United States, Donald Trump,
declared that the COVID-19 outbreak constituted a national emergency.2
As of November 2020, over 45 million people have been diagnosed with COVID-19
across 189 countries; over 1,200,000 of them have died.3 In response to the pandemic,
organizations, businesses, governments, and communities around the world mobilized to
not only detect and contain the virus, but develop techniques (or methods) to treat those
diagnosed with the disease.4 Unlike past pandemics, the COVID-19 pandemic is occurring
in a more connected and digitized world.5 Accordingly, governments around the world
have turned to technology to aid in their detection, containment, and treatment efforts
relating to COVID-19.6
Israel tasked its intelligence agency to track COVID-19 patients by leveraging telecom
data.7 The United Kingdom deployed law enforcement drones to monitor public spaces and
enforce social distancing practices.8 Hong Kong and India installed geofencing technology
to enforce quarantine zones.9 South Korea, China, Taiwan, and many other countries,
deployed smartphone applications for contact tracing.10 Like other counties, United States
politicians, businesses, and non-governmental organizations have called for or are

Timeline of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline; See International Health Regulations
(IHR), CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, GLOBAL HEALTH PROTECTION & SECURITY (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/ghs/ihr/index.html (discussing the International Health
Regulations [IHR] aim to keep the world informed about public health risks and events by requiring countries
to have the ability to detect, assess, report, and respond to public health events).
2 Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
Outbreak, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamationdeclaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/.
3 COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at John Hopkins University
(JHU), JOHNS HOPKINS U. (Oct. 10, 2020, 1:23 PM), https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (“JHU Dashboard”
provides case counts of confirmed and probable cases and the total number of cases and deaths are likely
undercounts).
4 See generally LEESA LIN & ZHIYUAN H OU, Combat COVID-19 with Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, J. OF
TRAVEL MED. 1-4 (May 21, 2020), https://www.doi.org/10.1093/jtm/taaa080.
5 Marcello Ienca & Effy Vayena, On the Responsible Use of Digital Data to Tackle the COVID-19 Pandemic,
NATURE MED. 463 (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0832-5; See Past Pandemics,
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
I NFLUENZA (FLU) (Aug.
10, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/basics/past-pandemics.html.
6 SEE Liza Lin & Timothy W. Martin, How Coronavirus Is Eroding Privacy, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 15, 2020, 11:03
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-paves-way-for-new-age-of-digital-surveillance11586963028.
7 Id. at 1, 3.
8 Id. at 1.
9 Id. at 1.
10 Id. (explaining that contact tracing is the process of identifying individuals who may have close contact with
an infected person).
1
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deploying various technologies to contain the spread of the virus.11 While this article
references efforts by other countries, it focuses specifically on the United States.
Protected Health Information (“PHI”) is at the core of the technologies leveraged in
the fight against COVID-19.12 In aggregate, PHI is leveraged for data modeling, contact
tracing, quarantine enforcement, symptom tracking, and the like.13 However, privacy and
security concerns regarding the collection, use, and dissemination of PHI are widespread..14
Individuals may believe that their PHI is protected under statutory, regulatory, or
constitutional protections (e.g., the Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
[“HIPAA”] or the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). Individuals may trust the
data collectors’ privacy, cybersecurity protocols, and technologies that are designed to
protect Personal Information (“PI”) or PHI.15 But as individuals’ willingness to share their
PHI increases because of the pandemic, is their PHI and PI truly protected? 16 And if so, to
what extent?
This article discusses the data privacy and security issues with respect to health
surveillance technologies within the United States. This article is not an exhaustive
analysis of the health surveillance technologies or the legality or constitutionality of the
technologies. However, unlike other scholarly work, this article is a deeper analysis into
See generally Adam Cancryn, Kushner’s Team Seeks National Coronavirus Surveillance System, POLITICO,
(Apr. 8, 2020, 12:19 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/07/kushner-coronavirus-surveillance174165 (describing the containment and surveillance efforts by the federal government and how it will use
various technologies to combat COVID-19; I use the term “organizations” interchangeably with “companies”
and “businesses” throughout this article. At times, I use the term “organizations” to include governments).
12 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (PHI includes information that (i) identifies, or can reasonably be used to identify,
an individual; (ii) is created or received by a covered entity [e.g., health plan, health care provider, employer,
or health care clearinghouse]; (iii) relates to an individual’s physical or mental health, health care provision, or
payment for provision of health care; and (iv) is transmitted by or maintained in electronic or any other format).
13 See generally Carmel Shachar, Protecting Privacy in Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19: Avoiding a
Regulatory
Patchwork,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS,
(May
19,
2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200515.190582/full/; See also Marcello Ienca & Effy
Vayena supra note 5.
14 See Cancryn supra note 11; AARON R. BROUGH & KELLY D. MARTIN, Consumer Privacy During (and After)
the
COVID-19
Pandemic,
J.
OF
PUB.
POL’Y
&
MKTG.
(May
28,
2020),
https://doi.org/10.1177/0743915620929999; Stephen P. Mulligan et al., DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN
OVERVIEW, CONG. RES. SERV., (2019) (Data privacy relates to the control, use, and dissemination of personal
information and PHI. Data security relates to (i) the protection of personal information and/or PHI from
unauthorized access or use, and (ii) the response to the unauthorized access or use of the personal information
or PHI); See also Chris D. Linebaugh, FACEBOOK’S $5 BILLION PRIVACY SETTLEMENT WITH THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, CONG. RES. SERV., (2019) (Data privacy and security concerns vary by person—not
everyone has the same level of concern—and some may have no privacy expectations).
15
See Art. 4 Global Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) Definitions, (EU) (Data collectors are organizations
that collect or store PI and PHI. For this article, data collectors include data processors [organizations that
conduct a series of actions or operations using the data] and data controllers [organizations that determine the
purposes and means of the data processing]); See also Definition of Processes, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/processes. (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (For this article, an
example of PHI is a positive diagnosis of COVID-19, and two examples of personal information (“PI”) are an
individual’s name and address).
16 Anindya Ghose, et al., Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During
COVID-19? SSRN (Aug. 15, 2020) (Working Paper, N.Y.U. STERN SCH. OF BUS.)
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3624069.
11
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the health surveillance technologies and the applicable legal standards; the objective is to
provide a better understanding of (i) the data privacy and security risks, and (ii) whether
the current data privacy and security regime in the United States provides sufficient
protections for individuals.
Part I discusses the health surveillance technologies. Part II explores various legal
standards and jurisprudence with respect to data privacy and security and how privacy
expectations have shifted and continue to do so since the pandemic began. Part II proposes
a framework to visualize the legal standards and show the shift in privacy expectations.
Part III presents a case study to show the legal standards as applied to deployed health
surveillance technologies. Part IV argues that the current data privacy and security regime
is ineffective and unworkable, and it proposes reforms to the data privacy and security
regime to effectuate real consumer protections.

II. THE COVID-19 SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES
The COVID-19 disease spread to 188 countries and infected 28.5 million people in
less than six months.17 With the infectiousness of COVID-19, governments and
organizations have turned to health surveillance technologies to help track and contain the
spread.18 At the core of these technologies is PI and PHI. And this data has quickly become
more relevant and valuable during the pandemic for policy planning, workforce planning,
diagnostics, stay-at-home order enforcement, and more.19 The collection, use, and
dissemination of this data raises data privacy and security concerns.
This Part I describes various health surveillance technologies, including how these
technologies incorporate data privacy and security. Section A details two technologies: (i)
contact tracing applications, and (ii) health monitoring platforms. Section B considers the
data and data supply chains that underlay these technologies, including user-inputted data,
queried data, and autogenerated data.20 Lastly, Section C discusses the data privacy and
security benefits and risks.
A.
An Overview of Two Technologies in the COVID-19 Pandemic
Many technologies have been developed and deployed in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. But at least two technologies are concerning to privacy advocates and scholars:
contact tracing applications and health monitoring platforms. This Section A provides an
overview of these technologies, including some of the benefits and risks with respect to the
data collection, use, and dissemination.

17

See JMU DASHBOARD, supra note 3.
Theodore Claypoole, COVID-19 and Data Privacy: Health vs. Privacy, A.B.A.(Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2020/04/health-vs-privacy/.
19 Cynthia Dwork, et al., On Privacy in the Age of COVID-19, J. OF PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY (June 25,
2020), https://doi.org/10.29012/jpc.749.
20 A data supply chain is the end-to-end flow of data across systems and technologies, including data suppliers
and end-users. User-inputted data is data that is provided by the user (e.g., email address when creating a new
account). Queried data is data obtained by the data processor by third-party data suppliers. Autogenerated data
is data that is automatically captured or recorded; See infra Figure 1.
18
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First, contact tracing applications are smartphone-based mobile applications that
supplement or replace conventional contact tracing.21 Conventional contact tracing
involves manual interviews of infected individuals, conducted by public health authorities,
that aim to collect information regarding who the infected individual physically contacted
since becoming infected.22 Because manual interviews of infected individuals are very
difficult to scale during a global pandemic and alternative options exist today, governments
and other organizations have turned to smartphone contact tracing applications that utilize
geolocation data, either by the phone’s Bluetooth, WiFi, or GPS.23
Organizations quickly developed and released contact tracing applications. Apple and
Google partnered to develop the “Exposure Notification System,” (“ENS”) a privacypreserving technology that uses Bluetooth, to help public health officials develop and
launch their own contact tracing applications.24 The ENS allows for iOS and Android
devices to exchange beacons (similar to exchanging business cards) with other devices that
have the ENS-based application installed.25 For instance, if Jane Doe comes into contact
with an infected individual (i.e., an individual who tested positive for COVID-19), then
Jane Doe is notified via the ENS-based application by public health authorities.26
But Apple and Google are not the only organizations developing contact tracing
technologies. In less than a month after the pandemic declaration, the Peruvian government
launched a mobile application that uses GPS data for contact tracing.27 Two months after
the declaration, the South Korean government launched two applications, one of which
was created by private developers.28 Singapore, India, Israel, Hong Kong, Italy, and others
also launched contact tracing applications since the pandemic began.29
In the United States, several contact tracing applications appeared on Google’s Play
and Apple’s App Stores, some of which were not tied to a public health agency or

21

Nadeem Ahmed, et al., A Survey of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, CORNELL U., ARXIV.ORG (July 28,
2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.10306.
22 Ahmed, supra note 21, at 27 (explaining that contact tracing plays an important role in the control of
infectious diseases, and how its value is widely accepted in public health globally); See Don Klinkenberg, et
al., The Effectiveness of Contact Tracing in Emerging Epidemics, PLOS ONE (Dec. 20, 2006),
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0000012; Contact Tracing, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 9, 2017),
https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/contact-tracing.
23 Tony Romm, et al., U.S. Government, Tech Industry Discussing Ways to Use Smartphone Location Data to
Combat
Coronavirus,
WASH.
POST
(March
17,
2020,
6:15
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/17/white-house-location-data-coronavirus/.
24 Ryan Chiavetta, Google, Apple Outline Privacy Considerations for Exposure Notification System, INT’L
ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (June 26, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/google-apple-outline-privacyconsiderations-within-exposure-notification-system/.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Catherine Escobedo, Geolocation and Other Personal Data Used in the Fight Against COVID-19, INT’L
ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (last visited Oct 8, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/geolocation-and-other-personaldata-used-in-the-fight-against-covid-19/.
28 Samantha Tsang, Here Are the Contact Tracing Apps Being Deployed Around the World, I NT’L ASS’N OF
PRIVACY PROF’LS (Apr. 28, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/here-are-the-contact-tracing-apps-being-employedaround-the-world/.
29
Id.
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authority.30 Attorneys General from nearly forty states, as well as other policymakers and
regulators, recognized that while contact tracing applications aid in combating the spread
of COVID-19, many private companies may exploit the pandemic to collect PI or PHI. 31
New York’s Attorney General, Letitia James, said, “some companies may seek to take
advantage of consumers and use [PI] to advertise, mine [the] data, and unethically profit
off this pandemic,” and many likely do not know who or what is behind the efforts.32 But
regardless of whether the effort is a public-private partnership or wholly private endeavor,
these efforts have received criticism from the general public and privacy experts regarding
the data privacy and security capabilities.33 The criticism is warranted because these
applications collect, use, and disseminate PI and PHI.
Second, health monitoring platforms are software solutions that enable organizations
to collect, store, and monitor PHI.34 While the term “health monitoring platforms” is broad,
for this article, I consider only the platforms that can be leveraged in response to the
pandemic and are consumer-facing.
Health monitoring platforms have various purposes, features, and capabilities. For
example, Safe Health Systems, Inc. (“SAFE”) sells a platform that provides diagnostics,
health record management, provider services, and the like.35 FamHis, Inc. sells a white
label platform (more on white label platforms below), FamGenix, that focuses on collecting
family health history information.36 Advancia Technologies and RingMD jointly sell a
COVID-19 risk mitigation platform that allows for patient risk assessments, triage, and
contact tracing.37 And in April 2020, Pager, Inc. (“Pager”) released its white label COVID19 solution that offers health providers triage, risk assessment, and telemedicine
capabilities.38
Other software platforms may not be designed for healthcare applications, yet they
incorporate features and capabilities that are valuable to the pandemic’s response. For
example, human capital management (“HCM”) platforms are designed for human
resources departments to manage new employee onboarding, payroll, compensation, and
the like. But many HCM platforms, like the Dayforce product from Ceridian HCM, Inc.,
have features that map the location of employees.39 Employee mapping help employers

Allison Grande, Apple, Google Urged to Ax COVID-19 Apps With No Gov’t Ties, LAW360 (June 16, 2020,
10:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1283641/apple-google-urged-to-ax-covid-19-apps-with-no-govt-ties.
31 See generally id.
32 Grande, Supra note 30.
33 See Chiavetta, supra note 24.
34
Rachel Ranosa, COVID-19: 6 Apps to Monitor Employee Health, HUM. RES. DIR. (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.hcamag.com/us/specialization/hr-technology/covid-19-6-apps-to-monitor-employeehealth/220371.
35 SAFE HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., https://safehealth.me (last visited Oct 8, 2020).
36 FAMHIS, INC., https://famgenix.com/white-label/ (last visited Oct 8, 2020).
37 COVID-19 Needs & Resources Matching, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, (last visited Oct 8, 2020),
https://www.nga.org/coronavirus-resources/.
38 PRESS RELEASE, Pager’s New COVID-19 Solution Aims to Help Flatten the Curve, PAGER INC. (Apr. 2,
2020), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200402005294/en/Pager’s-New-COVID-19-SolutionAims-Flatten-Curve.
39
See Ranosa, supra note 34.
30
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understand whether their employees are at home or at the office, the chances of exposure
to the virus, and the risk of infection.40
Health monitoring platforms can be white label platforms—fully developed and
supported software solutions made by one company but sold to and used by another
company.41 For example, a multinational corporation may embed the Pager platform into
its internal mobile application, and it could require all of its employees to complete an
initial risk assessment before its employees can return to the office.42 A high risk employee
may be prohibited from returning to the office.43 White label platforms significantly reduce
the development requirements, which in turn, allow organizations to deploy a solution
more quickly.44
Like contact tracing applications, the health monitoring platforms collect PI and PHI.
In the employer-employee example, the employee submits multiple data elements, such as
symptom status, health history, or travel history. The data is collected and stored by the
platform provider (e.g., Pager) or the employer.45 This raises data privacy and security
concerns.46 Using a platform, or manually collecting this data, employers can collect
significant amounts of PHI from its employees, which can be vulnerable to data privacy or
security risks if improperly collected, accessed, handled, used, or processed.47
The technologies deployed to combat the spread of COVID-19 are becoming the next
treasure trove of PI and PHI. These are two examples; other technologies are omitted from
this overview, but nonetheless, others are collecting the PI and PHI. With the collection,
use, and dissemination of PI and PHI via these technologies and the organizations behind
them, the concerns about data privacy and security are warranted. To better understand
why data privacy and security concerns are warranted, I turn to an overview of the data and
data supply chains.
B.
An Overview of the Data and the Data Supply Chains of COVID-19
Technologies
Data is at the core of the technologies deployed to combat COVID-19. A technology
solution is only as valuable as the data the solution collects, stores, and uses to deliver its
capabilities and meaningful insights to organizational leaders.48 This Section B presents an
40

Id.
Drew Gainor, Why a White Label Solution Is Easier Than Building Your Own, FORBES (June 3, 2014, 9:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/06/03/why-a-white-label-solution-is-easier-than-buildingyour-own/#14e8aa3bdd9e.
42 See generally Gainor, supra note 41.
43 See generally id.
44
See Carla Tardi, White Label Product, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated July 7, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/white-label-product.asp.
45
See, e.g., NGA ADVANCIA AND RINGMD PRESENTATION, supra note 37 (the Advancia and RingMD platform
is hosted by cloud providers [e.g., Amazon Web Services] or on-premise [i.e., in the deploying company’s data
centers and servers]).
46 See generally, Jedidiah Bracy, OSHA Revises Guidance on Tracking COVID-19 in the Workplace, INT’L
ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (June 1, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/osha-releases-guidance-on-tracking-covid19-in-the-workplace/.
47 See generally id.
48 Other technologies (e.g., thermal imaging, biometrics, telemedicine, 3D printing, etc.) deployed to combat
the pandemic leverage substantial amounts of PI and PHI; See generally The Top 5 Practical Digital Health
41
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overview of data and data supply chains to illustrate the data ecosystem.49 Without the
understanding of the data ecosystem, one is limited in evaluating the data privacy and
security risks.50 And without the understanding of the risks, one cannot form effective
protections for individuals against those risks.51
I start by distinguishing data into three categories—user-inputted, queried, and
autogenerated. Next, I describe how the data categories play into a company’s data supply
chain. Last, I detail how companies use the data while leveraging other technologies, such
as machine learning (“ML”) and artificial intelligence (“AI”).
There are three types of data: (1) user-inputted data, (2) queried data, and (3)
autogenerated data (Figure 1). User-inputted data includes basic data elements that a user
provides the software or application herself (e.g., name, email, phone). Queried data
includes the data about an individual that is sourced from third parties. For example, to
open a credit account at a bank, the bank will query data from a credit bureau (e.g., credit
history and score) before decisioning the credit application. Autogenerated data is
generated and collected about an individual through automation (e.g., behavioral analytics
of a user and her interactions with a website). For Figure 1, I use the Five Building Blocks
of Identity (Figure 1.1) (“Building Blocks”) to describe how the three categories of data
are used.52

Technologies in the Fight Against COVID-19: An Infographic, MEDICAL FUTURIST (May 7, 2020),
https://medicalfuturist.com/the-top-5-practical-digital-health-technologies-in-the-fight-against-covid-19-aninfographic/.
49 The term “data supply chain” includes the end-to-end processes, systems, and organizations used to collect,
store, use, and disseminate data. This could include data providers, such as data brokers, and data storage
providers, such as Amazon Web Services. This could also include data processors, such as ML / AI providers
that process the data to derive analytics, insights, and the like.
50 See infra Part I.C.
51 See infra Part IV.
52 Kaelyn Lowmaster, ET AL., Digital Identity: The Foundation for Trusted Transactions in Financial Services,
CAPCO (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.capco.com/Capco-Institute/Journal-47-Digitization/Digital-IndentityThe-foundation-for-trusted-transactions-in-financial-services.
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Figure 1. Data Categories Chart
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Individuals often believe that the data collected by companies is either (i) the data that
a user inputs into the software (e.g., name), or (ii) the data that the user generates via her
interactions with the software that the user can see (e.g., total dollar amount of an
eCommerce transaction).54 But this is an elementary understanding of the data ecosystem
because user-inputted data is only a part of picture—it neglects queried data and
autogenerated data.55
While the majority of Americans acknowledge they are being tracked, 79% of adults
state they have little to no understanding about what the government does with their data,
and this is likely the same percentage with respect to the private sector.56 For instance,
when asked about what privacy means, one survey respondent stated, “My personal
information is secure. No one knows my credit card numbers, address info, where I have
been, my banking info, my health info, etc. People don’t know anything about me I do not
54

For this article, user-inputted data includes both the data that a user inputs into the software and the data that
the user generates via her interactions with the software. The latter is distinguished from autogenerated data
because autogenerated data is not necessarily produced as an outcome of a user’s inputs or interactions with
the software—this data the user can see for herself or himself. For instance, while an eCommerce transaction’s
total dollar amount is automatically calculated, the calculation is a result of the user’s input, and autogenerated
data could be the browsing analytics (e.g., how long a user remains on a page, the clickthrough rates, etc.) that
the user cannot see herself.
55 See Emily Stewart, Lawmakers Seem Confused About What Facebook Does – and How to Fix It, VOX (Apr.
10,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/10/17222062/mark-zuckerberg-testimonygraham-facebook-regulations (detailing the lack of understanding by Congress and stating, “[p]lenty of people
have a very limited notion of how exactly Facebook’s business works, what happens to their data, and what
they can do to increase their privacy.”); See, e.g., Brittany Martin, Note, The Unregulated Underground Market
for Your Data: Providing Adequate Protections for Consumer Privacy in the Modern Era, 105 IOWA L. REV.
865, 870-72 (2020) (explaining that data brokers get data from publicly available records kept by governments,
social media and blogs, and commercial sources (e.g., retailers). But Martin’s article fails to consider queried
and autogenerated data that most users are not aware is being tracked, stored, used, and disseminated).
56 Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their
Personal Information 10, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wpcontent/uploads/sites/9/2019/11/Pew-Research-Center_PI_2019.11.15_Privacy_FINAL.pdf (a total of 4,272
panelists responded to the survey out of the 5,869 sampled. The survey was conducted between June 3-17,
2020, with the response rate of 73%. The margin of sampling error for the 4,272 respondents is ±1.9%. For the
survey’s methodology, See AUXIER at 46-47. “Tracked” means the monitoring by companies and the
government with some regularity); See also Brian Mastroianni, Survey: More Americans Worried About Data
Privacy Than Income, CBS NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/truste-survey-moreamericans-concerned-about-data-privacy-than-losing-income/ (discussing a survey by TRUSTe/National
Cyber Security Alliance regarding Americans and data privacy).
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intend to share.”57 This response demonstrates an elementary understanding of what data
is collected—if the concept of data privacy for 79% of Americans extends insofar as
surface-level PI, such as credit card numbers, then it suggests that 79% of Americans are
likely not aware of the totality of data at play.
User-inputted data is only a piece of the pie—an organization can query user-inputted
data to obtain more PI than what the user provided. For instance, Company X may collect
the name, address, and email address from the user, and it can query these data elements
with a third-party provider, such as Neustar, Inc. (“Neustar”).58 Company X sends Neustar
the data elements, Neustar’s product matches the individual with its database, and then
Neustar populates any missing data, such as the individual’s telephone number, age,
gender, income level, etc.59 The data that Neustar provides Company X is the queried data.
Both Company X and its third-party data provider form Company X’s data supply
chain—Neustar being a data supplier to Company X. Company X maintains a more
extensive data supply chain. Company X may want to track the behavioral data and
analytics (autogenerated data) of its users who visit its website or use its mobile application.
Company X could use Hotjar Ltd.’s (“Hotjar”) product that provides Company X with user
heatmaps, funnels, recordings, and more.60 With Hotjar, Company X can track how users
click-through, tap, and scroll through its website.61 It can identify where its users are exiting
the website using Hotjar’s funnel feature.62 And with Hotjar’s Recording feature, Company
X can watch recordings of users’ interactions and behaviors on its website.63 By embedding
Hotjar into its platform, Company X autogenerates data—data that many individuals are
likely not aware of given the 79% of Americans who hold a limited understanding of data
collection.64
Now, Company X has two data suppliers—Neustar and Hotjar—each providing
Company X with different sets of information that Company X can leverage for decisioning
(Figure 2). But a user may not care about the traditional PI and behavioral analytics
tracking. The user may be more concerned with her geolocation data because geolocation
data is more sensitive than traditional PI; 82% of adults feel that the details of their physical
location is somewhat or very sensitive.65 Even the Supreme Court recognizes geolocation
data is of great concern with respect to one’s privacy.66
57

Auxier, supra note 56, at 13.
See NEUSTAR, INC., https://www.cdn.neustar/resources/product-literature/marketing/neustar-marketingcustomer-identity-file-solution-sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2020) (Neustar provides real-time data to
organizations across four main product lines: marketing, risk, communications, and security solutions).
59 Id.
60 See HOTJAR LTD., https://www.hotjar.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
61 See Heatmaps, HOTJAR LTD., https://www.hotjar.com/tour/#heatmaps (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
62
See Conversion Funnels, HOTJAR LTD., (last visited July 22, 2020).
63 See Visitor Recordings, HOTJAR LTD., https://www.hotjar.com/tour/#recordings (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
64 See Auxier, supra note 56.
65 Mary Madden, Americans Consider Certain Kinds of Data to Be More Sensitive than Others, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2014/11/12/americans-consider-certain-kinds-ofdata-to-be-more-sensitive-than-others/.
66 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (recognizing that when the Government tracks
the geolocation data of one’s cell phone, the Government “achieves near perfect surveillance, as if [the
Government] attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.”); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014)
58
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Figure 2. Company X’s Data Supply Chain

Turning back to the Neustar example, Company X may automatically collect the
IP address when the user visits its website. Company X can send the IP address to Neustar,
and Neustar can return more than 40 data elements including the IP’s continent, country,
state, city, zip code, latitude and longitude.67 Company X can identify the user’s
geolocation to the specific longitude and latitude using just the user’s IP address.
A user’s geolocation is autogenerated data and is critical to digital contact
tracing.Mobile devices locate themselves using a variety of signals from satellites (GPS),
cell towers, WiFi networks, Bluetooth signals, and proximity to other devices.68 Carriers,
the device’s operating system, applications, data brokers, other third parties use the
geolocation data from a mobile device.69 Even if a user’s PI is removed from the data set
(e.g., if Company X separates a user’s name from her geolocation data), geolocation data
can be traced back to the specific user because geolocation data contains information
regarding the user’s “sensitive locations,” such as the user’s home and office locations.70

(recognizing that modern cell phones “implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of
a cigarette pack, wallet, or purse.”).
67 See UltraGeoPoint Provides Insight into 99.99% of All Routable IP Addresses, NEUSTAR, INC. 1 (May 12,
2020), https://www.cdn.neustar/resources/product-literature/security/neustar-ip-geopoint-solution-sheet.pdf.
68 Stacey Gray, The World of Geolocation Data, FUTURE OF PRIVACY F. (May 22, 2020),
https://fpf.org/2020/05/22/understanding-the-world-of-geolocation-data/.
69 Id.
70 Id.; See Sarah Underwood, Can You Locate Your Location Data?, COMMC’NS OF THE ACM (Sept. 2019),
https://www.doi.org/10.1145/3344291 (detailing how users often lack the awareness that mobile applications
collect location data, including applications such as Snapchat and Tinder).
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It is possible for autogenerated data to be sourced from a third party. In other
words, what is queried data for one organization may be autogenerated data for another
organization. For example, even though the Secret Service does not collect geolocation
data itself, it sources the data from third party suppliers—often avoiding the warrant
requirement.71
This data (user-inputted, queried, and autogenerated data) can be combined with
other technologies, such as ML and AI. Public health authorities, researchers, and experts
are leveraging ML-based technologies to study COVID-19, test potential treatments,
diagnose patients, analyze public impacts of the pandemic, and model the spread of
COVID-19.72
For example, Chinese doctors used AI to leverage data from the first onset of COVID19 to detect disease using chest CT scans.73 Their efforts resulted in a deep learning model
that accurately detects COVID-19 and differentiates it from other lung diseases.74 The
construction of any deep learning module with this objective requires big data sets of
individuals’ PI and PHI. 75
For these technologies to function properly, the software requires the user’s PI and PHI
to develop and test the application. Moreover, ML and AI require massive data sets to train
the software and its functionality.76 Here, the software is only as valuable as the data the
software collects, stores, and uses. It is not unforeseeable that this data could be applied to
a variety of other applications, such as governmental health surveillance after the pandemic
ends. Using the data in other applications than originally intended is one example of a data
privacy and security risk—the topic that I turn to next.
C.
A Discussion Regarding Data Privacy and Security Risks
The amount of data being collected, used, stored, and disseminated in response to
COVID-19 brings serious risks. This Section C describes several benefits and risks
associated with health surveillance technologies that collect substantial amounts of PI and
PHI. First, this section explains how the aggregation of large data sets is benefitting the
response to COVID-19. Then, it presents the possible abuses of the data during and after
the pandemic. Second, I describe the risk and consequences of a data breach. And third, I
detail how the risks apply to the individual, and it balances the risks against the public
health benefits in response to the pandemic.
There is a trade off with the collection of PI and PHI in response to the pandemic—
balancing an individual’s right to data privacy against the public health need in combating
COVID-19. With the clear public health interest, it is necessary to collect some level of PI
and PHI to deploy the health technologies that will assist in slowing the spread, but the
question becomes what is the optimal combination of COVID-19 response tactics that
71 Amanda Yeo, The Secret

Service Bought Phone Location Data, Dodging the Need for a Warrant, MASHABLE
(Aug. 19, 2020), https://sea.mashable.com/tech/12013/the-secret-service-bought-phone-location-datadodging-the-need-for-a-warrant.
72 Brenda Leong & Dr. Sara Jordan, Artificial Intelligence and the COVID-19 Pandemic, FUTURE OF PRIVACY
F. (May 7, 2020), https://fpf.org/2020/05/07/artificial-intelligence-and-the-covid-19-pandemic/.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See id.
76 ML and AI require large data sets to train the technologies’ functionality. See LEONG, supra note 72 (quality
of system dependent on quality of data).
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allow for the suppression of the virus and disease but at a low human, civil, and economic
cost?77
The goal of collecting the PI and PHI during and after the pandemic is to eradicate the
virus and disease.78 Stefan Pollinger, a researcher at Toulouse School of Economics in
France, argues that the optimal combination of social distancing and case detection (e.g.,
contact tracing) allows for the suppression of COVID-19 at low additional human and
economic costs (e.g., the costs associated with individuals’ privacy) if the proper balance
is struck between social distancing and case detection—where social distancing decreases
the growth rate of COVID-19 by reducing the contact between individuals and case
detection isolates infectious individuals from the susceptible population.79 Social
distancing is costly, and it becomes inefficient when the prevalence of COVID-19 is low.80
When the prevalence is low, public health authorities can concentrate resources towards
case detection, where the detection rate and efficiency of detection increase when the
prevalence is low.81 Taken together, these complementary responses to COVID-19, when
optimally balanced, curtail the cost of suppression.82
In Pollinger’s optimal suppression theory, PI and PHI add value to both sides of the
equation; the data can be used to track social distancing, and the data can be used in case
detection—key benefits to the aggregation and mining of large data sets. For example, for
social distancing tracking, location data from Apple’s navigation application, Maps, can
be aggregated to track societal movement.83 Further, OpenTable data can track restaurant
bookings.84
However, as Pollinger and other scholars note, the risks of collecting the PI and PHI
are also present.85 While the purpose of collecting the PI and PHI may be for contact tracing
and health monitoring, the data may be used after the pandemic ends for other purposes;
this is known as mission creep or function creep.86 Function creep is when data is collected
77

See generally Stefan Pollinger, COVID-19: Suppression Is Possible but at What Cost to Our Privacy?,
WORLD ECON. F. (July. 8, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/07/suppressing-covid-19-with-acombination-of-social-distancing-and-case-detection/ (theorizing the eradication of COVID-19 is possible
through a combination of contact tracing, case detection, and social distancing—all of which could have a low
civil, human, and economic cost).
78 See id.
79
Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Alex Harring & Nate Rattner, Here Are Five Charts Illustrating U.S. Economic Trends Amid the
Coronavirus Pandemic, CNBC (July 19, 2020. 9:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/19/five-chartsillustrating-us-economic-trends-amid-coronavirus.html (Compared to the baseline pre-pandemic average, the
change in volume of navigation requests decreased by approximately 50% at the end of March into May 2020).
84 Id. (OpenTable is a mobile application that allows users to make restaurant reservations. It reported a 100%
decline in restaurant bookings via its mobile application at the end of March into May 2020).
85 See generally Pollinger, supra note 77 (including privacy as an economic and health cost of the optimal
suppression theory).
86 See Dwork, supra note 19, at 1; See also Wendy Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and
Medical Privacy, 87 BOS. U. L. REV. 347 (2007) (discussing public health surveillance programs and mission
creep in the health sphere); Evelina Manukyan & Joseph Guzzetta, How Function Creep May Cripple AppBased Contact Tracing, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (May 27, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/howfunction-creep-may-cripple-app-based-contact-tracing/# (refers to mission creep as function creep).
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for one purpose but is then used for other purposes, which often stray from the original
intention.87
For example, PI collected for a contact tracing application, when used for other
purposes and combined with other data sets from a company’s data supply chain, can reveal
social and political contacts.88 This data could reveal an individual’s daily routine, and with
function creep, this data can be leveraged for marketing and advertising purposes or to
compromise the individual’s safety and security.
Several scholars and practitioners advocate for data minimization to prevent function
creep.89 However, there are two issues with data minimization, especially with respect to
collecting PI and PHI in response to the pandemic: (i) organizations are not incentivized to
practice data minimization, and (ii) even if an organization practices data minimization
with respect to collecting PI and PHI from the individual, the organization is still able to
pair the data collected to its queried or autogenerated data. Organizations are not
incentivized to minimize their data collection because most organizations monetize the
data—a crucial part of their business models.90
Several contact tracing applications state that they practice data minimization—going
as far as claiming no PI is collected.91 Researchers from the University of California, Irvine
(“UC Irvine”) proposed an application that “respects user privacy by not collecting location
information or other personal data.”92 Their proposed application would use checkpoints
in lieu of geolocation tracking—users would create new or join existing “checkpoints.”93
To check-in, users scan a QR code.94 Users can voluntarily report a positive COVID-19
diagnosis, and any user can check their “risk level” by reviewing their exposures to possible
transmission routes.95
Here, while the researchers at UC Irvine, in theory, created a contact tracing application
that protects privacy via data minimization, the application is unrealistic because the
application’s design will not generate the user adoption necessary for the application to be
effective. The user experience (e.g., the use of QR codes) requires affirmative actions by
the user, and the application’s core function relies on users taking these affirmative
actions.96 Each action required by the user creates friction in the user experience, and each
friction point increases the probability that a user will not complete the end goal (creating

87

Manukyan, supra note 86.
Dwork, supra note 19, at 1.
89 See Jennifer Baker, Pandemic Incites Concerns About Data-Sharing Overreach, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY
PROF’LS (Mar. 26, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/global-pandemic-incites-concerns-about-data-sharingoverreach/; Data minimization is when an organization or product only collects the data that the organization
or product needs to collect and deletes any data that the organization may have collected but no longer needs.
90 See id. (noting that Google may have altruistic reasons for collecting PI and PHI during the pandemic, but
Google unequivocally leverages PI to generate revenue).
91 See, e.g., Tyler Yasaka et al., Peer-to-Peer Contact Tracing: Development of a Privacy-Preserving
Smartphone App, 8 JMIR MHEALTH UHEALTH (July 4, 2020), https://mhealth.jmir.org/2020/4/e18936.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96
Id.
88

55

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:1]

and checking into checkpoints by scanning QR codes).97 This is especially true today
because frictionless or friction-minimal user experiences have become the norm.98
A frictionless or friction-minimal user experience will require some level of PI and
PHI collection, sharing, and usage.99 Because of this, several scholars and practitioners
advocate for data anonymization.100 But as previously explained, even if “anonymous” or
non-identifiable data is collected, such data cannot be truly anonymous because the data
can be linked to individuals through “reidentification.”101 The data collector can source PI
and PHI to “fill in the gaps,” and by doing so, it can link the data sets together to reconstruct
the personal identity profile.102
While an organization may rely on its data suppliers, there are other methods that an
organization may pursue to collect PI and PHI that do not require a third-party supplier.
The PI and PHI that an organization collects can be combined with data scraped off the
internet.103 If Clearview AI, a startup that has collected over three billion photos of
individuals by scraping the internet, can compile a massive database of PI via internet
scraping, then any organization or malicious actor can do the same.104 Between scraping
the internet and sourcing queried data, organizations can take the pandemic-related PI and
PHI and capitalize on it in other ways.
Considering the sources that an organization can leverage to gather data (collecting PI
and PHI themselves, sourcing data from its supply chain, and scraping data), an
organization can leverage other technologies, such as AI and ML, to use and mine the
data—gathering insights, identifying monetization opportunities, exploiting psychology to
influence individuals, etc. Dr. Dipayan Ghosn, the Pozen Fellow at the Shorenstein Center
on Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and former Policy
Advisor in the Obama White House, notes, “the industry’s goal is to enter our mind and
move our psychology,” and considering that AI and ML mature organically by learning
97

See Victoria Young, Strategic UX: The Art of Reducing Friction, TELEPATHY (A SERVICENOW COMPANY),
https://www.dtelepathy.com/blog/business/strategic-ux-the-art-of-reducing-friction (“friction is defined as
interactions that inhibit people from intuitively and painlessly achieving their goals within the digital interface.
Friction is a major problem because it leads to bouncing, reduces conversions, and frustrates would-be
customers to the point of abandoning their tasks.”).
98 Id.
99
Friction-minimal user interface design is defined as creating a user experience that minimizes the friction
points, which in turn, decreases bouncing, increases conversion rates, etc.
100 See Liane Colonna, Privacy, Risk, Anonymization and Data Sharing in the Internet of Health Things, J. OF
TECH. L. & POL’Y (2020), https://www.doi.org/10.5195/tlp.2020.235/ (assessing data anonymization as a risk
mitigation strategy to reduce privacy concerns in the “Internet of Health Things”).
101 See id.; See also Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).
102 See supra Part I.B.
103 Internet scraping is the process of creating a bot (software code) to pull or download information or data
from websites; See, e.g., David Conrad, “Scraping” of a Publicly-Accessible Website Database May Be
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, JD SUPRA (July 14, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/scrapingof-a-publicly-accessible-33549/ (explaining an Eleventh Circuit holding in a case that involved internet
scraping).
104 See Davey Alba, A.C.L.U. Accuses Clearview AI of Privacy ‘Nightmare Scenario’, N.Y. TIMES (June 3,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/technology/clearview-ai-privacy-lawsuit.html; See also Ben
Kochman, Privacy and Cybersecurity Cases to Watch in 2nd Half of 2020, LAW360 (July 24, 2020),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1290397.
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from data sets, the influencing of one’s psychology is “an experimentally and empirically
evolved animal (AI/ML) trained to identify opportunities for economic arbitrage.”105
Despite the altruistic statements by organizations that have sought or are seeking to collect
the PI and PHI during the pandemic, as Ghosh argues, “there is no incentive for
[organizations] to delete the [PI] they have already accumulated [because data]
contribute[s] to the high margins experienced across the sector.”106
With the constant data collection and usage, often leveraging AI and ML, data is
created every second.107 These massive databases of PI and PHI are subject to data
breaches.108 And the healthcare industry is slowest at identifying or detecting a data breach
after one occurred, which amplifies the risk.109 On average, the healthcare industry takes
236 days to identify a breach and then 93 days to contain the breach.110
Therefore, with respect to PI and PHI data collection, the risk for individuals is high,
while the incentives for organizations are significantly lower. Organizations can collect PI
and PHI and combine the data with other data sets obtained through its data supply chain
or internet scraping. Then, they can leverage AI and ML to monetize the data and its
insights, or they can psychologically influence individuals and the society.
Notwithstanding the typical individualized risks associated with PI abuse, such as identity
theft, the individualized risks with the COVID-19 pandemic are amplified.111 The
unauthorized disclosure of a positive COVID-19 diagnosis, for example, can subject an
individual to societal or familial avoidance or ostracization.112
While individuals are more willing to share their PI and PHI given the COVID-19
pandemic113, technologies, such as contact tracing applications and health monitoring
platforms, can collect massive amounts of data. The data can be combined with data
sourced from third party data suppliers and internet scraping.114 Considering this, the risks,
such as function creep and data breaches, to individuals is not simply great but is amplified
with respect to the pandemic.

Dipayan Ghosh, Don’t Give Up on Your Digital Privacy Yet, SLATE (July 17, 2020),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/07/data-privacy-surveillance-law-marketers.html.
106
Id.
107 Id.
108 See IBM SEC. AND PONEMON INST., COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT (2019) (the report considered the
“typical activities” for the discovery of and the response to a data breach to determine the identification and
response time. Seventeen industries were included in the study with a sample size of 507—13% of which are
based in the United States followed by 9% in India and the United Kingdom. A total of 16 countries or regions
were surveyed. For the survey’s methodology, see 67-73).
109 See id. at 54.
110 Id.
111 See generally Müge Fazlioglu, Privacy Risks to Individuals in the Wake of COVID-19, INT’L ASS’N OF
PRIVACY
PROF’LS
(June
2020),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/privacy_risks_to_individuals_in_the_wake_of_covid19.pdf.
112 See id. at 5; See also S ARAH MASLIN NIR, They Beat the Virus. Now They Feel Like Outcasts, N.Y. TIMES
(May 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/nyregion/coronavirus-victims-immunity.html (noting
COVID-19 survivors in New York faced stigmatization).
113 Ghose, supra note 16, at 26-27.
114
See supra Part I.B.
105
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III. THE CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS AND JURISPRUDENCE
Having discussed the technologies and data ecosystem, this article turns to the current
data privacy, security legal standards, and jurisprudence.
Despite concerns regarding privacy and security in the internet age115, individuals may
trust organizations to use best practices with respect to data privacy and security protocols
and legal standards. Although, the willingness to share data during the pandemic
increases116, the question is whether the current regime provides sufficient protections for
individuals, which is critically important given the opportunity for organizations to exploit
the willingness during the pandemic.
Section A discusses the constitutional protections for individuals provided in the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and state constitutions. Also, Section
A discusses statutory protections.117 Section B details the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard—the standard frequently used for privacy protections—and it provides a new
framework to evaluate privacy expectations and the reasonableness of those expectations.
Lastly, Section C explores the shift in privacy expectations caused by the pandemic.

A. Fourth Amendment, Statutory, and State Constitutional Protections
Data privacy and security protections are primarily provided for in the Fourth
Amendment and similar bodies of law.118 These sources of privacy protections are
discussed below.
The Fourth Amendment provides that individuals have a right to be secure “in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . ..”119 Its
purpose is to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals” against the arbitrary
invasions by government officials.120 The Framers included the Fourth Amendment in
response to the general warrants and writs of assistance of the colonial era that allowed the
British to invade and search individuals’ homes in an unrestrained manner.121
Over time, the Fourth Amendment’s search doctrine evolved from a trespass-centric
doctrine focused on “constitutionally protected areas” to a person-centric doctrine that
protects individuals when individuals seek to preserve their property as private.122
115

See Brooke Auxier, How Americans See Digital Privacy Issues amid the COVID-19 Outbreak, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (May 4, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/04/how-americans-see-digital-privacyissues-amid-the-covid-19-outbreak/ (finding the majority of Americans are concerned about data privacy and
security, yet they do not understand current privacy laws and regulations).
116
See generally Ghose, supra note 16, at 26-28.
117 State statutory protections are out of scope for this article.
118 Data privacy and security protections are also provided for in case law, state statutes, and federal and state
regulations. These are out of scope for this article. The U.S. Constitution provides for privacy protections in
other amendments (e.g., Third Amendment’s protection against the quartering of soldiers in one’s home, and
the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination), but these protections are out of scope because
they do not apply to data privacy and security; See U.S. CONST. amends. III & V.
119 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
120 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added).
121 Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
122
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405-06, n. 3 (2012); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992).
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Olmstead v. United States is one of the first cases that analyzed the distinction between the
two views. The issue in Olmstead was whether wiretapping a private phone conversation
was within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority,
applied the trespass-centric interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.123 But in his dissent,
Justice Louis Brandeis reasoned the Fourth Amendment to be widely applicable in
protecting individuals’ personal privacy because “[t]ime works changes [and it] brings into
existence new conditions and purposes” for such protections.124 In 1928, Justice Brandeis
recognized that the Court must look beyond the literal meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and adopt the person-centric interpretation because technological advancements in
surveillance were inevitable.125
Eventually, the Supreme Court adopted Justice Brandeis’s interpretation in Katz v.
United States.126 In Katz, the Court provided that the Fourth Amendment protects people
and not places.127 Justice Harlan’s concurrence introduced the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard that is pervasive throughout privacy and security law today.128
More recently, the Court recognized the sensitivity of data privacy in Carpenter v.
United States. The Court provided that “when the Government tracks the location of a cell
phone, it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the
phone’s user.”129 And in Riley v. California, at least with respect to the Fourth Amendment,
“modern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated
by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”130 In both cases, the Court set out
how modern technologies have great consequences for privacy because the technology has
the capability to capture every detail of an individual’s life.131 According to the Court, the
capability to collect and store the mass amount of data leads to a reasonable expectation of
privacy for the individual (i.e., data subject or user).132 Additionally, in United States v.
Jones, Justice Sotomayor specifically noted the sensitivity of location data — stating that
“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.”133
123

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (The majority held that wiretapping a private
individual’s phone did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation because the Fourth Amendment only
extended to physical invasions of a person’s home or property. Justice Brandeis dissented and argued for a
broad reading and application of the Fourth Amendment, which is widely adopted today. The majority’s
opinion in Olmstead v. United States was overturned in Katz v. United States); See Anthony P. Picadio, Privacy
in the Age of Surveillance: Technological Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 90 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 162,
164-65 (2019).
125
See Picadio, supra note 124, at 164.
126 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
127 Id. at 351.
128 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); See infra Part II.B (further explaining Justice Harlan’s reasonable
expectation of privacy test).
129 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
130 Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
131 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 394; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216-20.
132 See, e.g., Riley, 573 U.S. at 393-98; Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements).
133
Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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However, the Fourth Amendment, as with the entire United States Constitution, limits
the powers and authorities of the federal government and state governments; the Fourth
Amendment limitations apply to the states according to the incorporation doctrine under
the Fourteenth Amendment.134 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
private actors, but some state constitutions provide individuals privacy and security
protections from both public and private actors.135 For example, Arizona’s constitution
provides, “[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law.”136 Also, Hawaii’s constitution provides, “[t]he right of the people to
privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without a showing of a compelling state
interest.”137
In the absence of constitutional privacy and security protections, federal and state
statutory protections may apply. For instance, at the federal level, HIPAA applies to PHI,138
and at the state level, the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) applies to all PI that
any qualified business may collect from an individual.139
HIPAA requires covered entities (e.g., health care providers) and their business
associates to abide by data privacy, security, and breach notification requirements.140
Several exceptions may apply to HIPAA’s protections. For instance, the following
disclosures are permissible: (i) disclosures to public health authorities, (ii) disclosures to
individuals who may have been exposed to a communicable disease or may otherwise be
at risk of contracting or spreading a disease, and (iii) disclosures to prevent or lessen a
serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public.141

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fully incorporating the Fourth Amendment’s “unreasonable
searches and seizures” freedom onto the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
135 See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, N AT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 11, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-stateconstitutions.aspx (listing eleven states that provide explicit privacy protections in their state constitutions:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina,
and Washington).
136 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8.
137 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added); see infra Part II.B (discussing the balancing test of an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy against the state’s compelling interest).
138
The Supreme Court has also recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy of their
PHI, which supports the general conception that HIPAA recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy; See,
e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
139 See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45631, DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 123 (2019) (providing an overview of key statutory privacy and security protections, including HIPAA and
CCPA).
140
45 C.F.R. § 164 (HIPAA’s Security and Privacy Rules) (the Privacy Rule limits covered entities’ use and
sharing of PHI with third parties without valid patient authorization, unless a HIPAA exception applies. The
Security Rule requires covered entities to maintain administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to prevent
threats or hazards to the security of electronic PHI. And per the data breach notification requirement, known
as the Breach Notification Rule, covered entities must, upon the discovery of a data breach, notify affected
individuals within sixty calendar days); the Data Breach Notification Rule defines a data breach as the
“acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of [PHI] in a manner not permitted under [HIPAA] which compromises
the security or privacy of the [PHI]”; a business associate is any entity that, on the behalf of a covered entity,
creates, receives, maintains, or transmits PHI.
141 In respective order: 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv); 45 C.F.R. §
164.512(j)(1)(i).
134
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CCPA provides some of the most comprehensive data privacy and security protections
at a state level in the United States. To a prominent degree, the CCPA provides individuals
with the following rights and protections: (i) the right to know what PI is collected,
including how and why the PI is collected, (ii) the right to erase or delete one’s PI, (iii) the
right to opt-out of the sale of one’s PI, and (iv) the right not to be discriminated against for
exercising one’s rights and protections under the CCPA. 142 While California is not alone
in providing statutory privacy and security protections for individuals, the CCPA is
recognized as one of the country’s strongest and most comprehensive regimes.143
Between the Fourth Amendment, state constitutions, and federal and state statutory
protections, individuals have a “patchwork” of privacy and security protections in the
United States.144 But, none of the foregoing protections sufficiently and effectively protect
PI and PHI with respect to the data collected and used in response to the pandemic. Thus,
some state legislatures and Congress introduced legislation to protect individuals’ PI and
PHI, but, at least with respect to Congress, no proposed bill has gained traction.145
The common thread amongst the privacy and security protections is the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard—whether the individual had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the PI or PHI that the individual is claiming to be
private and secure. This standard is widely considered the foundational inquiry to any
assessment of privacy protections.146 With constitutional protections, the reasonable
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.140(c-o) (CCPA defines PI as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is
capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular
consumer or household”); See Eric Goldman, An Introduction to the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA),
INT’L
ASS’N
OF
PRIVACY
PROF’LS
4-6
(July
9,
2018),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Intro_to_CCPA.pdf (CCPA lists specific rights and protections that
are categorized in this article as these four categories. Other rights, protections, and obligations are provided
for in the CCPA).
143 See id.; Other states have different forms of data privacy and security protections. For instance, Illinois
enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) that protects individuals and their biometric data.
BIPA continues to generate significant litigation against technology companies including Facebook, Amazon,
and Microsoft; See ALAN S. WERNICK, Biometric Information – Permanent Personally Identifiable Information
Risk,
A.B.A.
(Feb.
14,
2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/bcl/2019/201902/fa_
8/.
144
Id. at 7 (noting that privacy protections for individuals come from a variety of laws that vary considerably
in their purpose and scope rather than a single comprehensive law).
145 See, e.g., Kansas Introduces the COVID-19 Contact Tracing Privacy Act, SEC. MAG. (June 9, 2020),
https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/92563-kansas-introduces-the-covid-19-contact-tracing-privacyact (a bill that aims to protect contact tracing data); See, e.g., Bobbie Johnson, The US’s Draft Law on Contact
Tracing Apps Is a Step Behind Apple and Google, MIT TECH. REV. (June 2, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/02/1002491/us-covid-19-contact-tracing-privacy-law-applegoogle/ (describing The Exposure Notification Privacy Act, a bipartisan proposal that would prevent potential
abuses by COVID-19 apps). Republican senators introduced the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act
that would implement protocols regarding the collection, use, and transfer of PI and PHI. Democratic senators
introduced the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act that would effectively do the same as the Republicans’
proposal. But one difference between the two bills is that the Public Health Emergency Privacy Act would
grant a private right of action.
146 See generally Mark Taylor & James Wilson, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Disclosure of Health
Data, MED. L. REV. (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fez009 (while Taylor and Wilson’s
article focuses on English law, the basis for privacy law in England is similar to the United States. Both regimes
rely on the reasonable expectations of privacy standard).
142
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expectation of privacy is found throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. With
statutory protections, the rights and protections are often, if not always, based on the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. For example, one has a reasonable expectation
of privacy with respect to one’s PHI, and, accordingly, Congress enacted HIPAA to protect
the privacy and security of PHI. Statutory protections also promote the reasonable
expectation of privacy—individuals expect PHI to be protected because HIPAA exists
today. Because privacy and security protections are based on and promote the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard, I turn to a deeper explanation of this standard.

B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard comes from Justice Harlan’s
concurrence in Katz v. United States.147 Regarding the Fourth Amendment, courts balance
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against any legitimate government
interest.148 For PHI specifically, the Supreme Court recognized that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their healthcare records, and, accordingly, the privacy
expectation is generally reflected in HIPAA.149 Since Katz, the Supreme Court has not
provided a coherent explanation to what makes a privacy expectation reasonable, and some
scholars argue that the Fourth Amendment’s jurisprudence is illogical, erratic, and
confusing.150 But more recently, other scholars identified common principles that thread
throughout the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—adding clarification to the Katz
standard and providing a framework to apply in future matters.151
To frame Section B, I first propose the Privacy Expectation Continuum (“Continuum”)
that visually depicts where an individual’s privacy expectations may fall and whether such
expectations are reasonable. Next, I explain the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
developed by Justice Harlan in Katz. I describe several relevant Fourth Amendment
doctrines that apply to the COVID-19 pandemic, and I explain various principles that give
light to what forms a privacy expectation and how the expectation is reasonable or not.
Lastly, I argue that the pandemic shifted the reasonable expectation of privacy with respect
to PI and PHI.

147

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Riley, 573 U.S. at 385 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
149 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 67.
150 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (2007); See
also Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(2020) (hereinafter “TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES”).
151 See TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 4 (detailing three principles of the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment decisions: (i) the intimacy of the place or thing targeted, (ii) the amount of information sought,
and (iii) the cost of the investigation); See also Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 139 (2016) (hereinafter “Tokson, Knowledge”); See, e.g., Weiyin Hong, Drivers and
Inhibitors of Internet Privacy Concern: A Multidimensional Development Theory Perspective, J. OF BUS.
ETHICS (June 11, 2019), https://www.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04237-1 (testing the Multidimensional
Development Theory (“MDT”) to the antecedents of internet privacy concern. MDT suggests that an
individual’s privacy concern is jointly determined by four factors: (i) environmental, (ii) individual, (iii)
information management, and (iv) interaction management factors).
148
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Privacy expectations fall on a continuum (Figure 3). I segment the continuum into
quadrants where Quadrant I is no expectation of privacy, II is low expectation of privacy,
III is high expectation of privacy, and IV is an expectation of complete privacy. Each
quadrant is marked with certain characteristics. For example, if an individual has no
privacy expectations (Quadrant I), then the individual has no control over the collection,
disclosure, storage, or usage of her information. Information in Quadrant II is minimally
controlled—the individual maintains some privacy expectations, but, otherwise, she
willingly discloses the information (e.g., email address). For Quadrant III, the individual
controls the information but recognizes the information must be disclosed in a limited
capacity in certain situations (e.g., social security number). Finally, for Quadrant IV, the
individual expects complete privacy, full control over the information, and strictly limited
disclosure or use of the information (e.g., sexual history).
For any information at issue, I consider two points on the Continuum—the objective
point and the subjective point. Individuals may place specific categories of information
into different quadrants (e.g., sexual history may fall into Quadrant II or III for some
individuals) according to their subjective privacy expectations. The reasonable person
standard determines the objective point. Considering this Continuum, I turn to an
explanation of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard before discussing how
reasonableness, the objective point, is determined.

Figure 3. Privacy Expectations Continuum

In Katz, Justice Harlan stated that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the
person who has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”152 The Supreme Court eventually adopted and
condensed Justice Harlan’s Katz standard—deciding that a search is unreasonable when
the government violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.153 The Court
has inconsistently applied and explained the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in
the cases since Katz.154
Despite its inconsistencies, the Court has established several doctrines that it applies
with some regularity. First, the third-party doctrine provides that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy with her information that she turns over or exposes to
third parties.155 For instance, an individual cannot reasonably expect her call log to be
152

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (holding that a person is to be free from unreasonable
government intrusion whenever an individual harbors a reasonable expectation of privacy).
154 See TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 7-8.
155
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
153
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private because the service provider sees this information.156 Here, the third-party doctrine
categorically places information turned over to third parties into Quadrant I despite an
individual personally believing her information falls into a higher quadrant.
While the third-party doctrine is still considered good law today, Justice Sotomayor
and many legal scholars advocate for the Court to revisit the doctrine because the doctrine
is “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”157
However, the Court has retreated from a broad application of the third-party
doctrine.158 In United States v. Miller, the Court broadly applied the third-party doctrine in
holding that the individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect
to PI held by third parties when the information is limited in scope and intrusion159 But
unlike Miller, in Carpenter, the Court stopped short of broadly applying the third-party
doctrine to PI that can reveal highly private personal affairs.160 Unlike in Miller, where
bank records reveal a limited scope of personal information, in Carpenter, cell phone
geolocation data reveals highly personal information such as political affiliations,
socialization habits, frequently visited locations, etc.161 Carpenter’s limit on the third-party
doctrine turned on the scope of the information and level of intrusion.
The level of intrusion or invasion is the second general “principle” that the Court
regularly applies.162 The general rule is that the more intrusive or invasive the action (i.e.,
search) taken, the more likely the action would infringe on the individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.163 The information at issue in Miller were bank records—the Court
held that bank records could only reveal some personal information.164 However, in
Carpenter, the information at issue—the cell phone geolocation data—revealed
significantly more personal information.165 In other words, the data in Carpenter was more
intrusive than the data in Miller.
The third relevant doctrine addresses technologically enhanced searches. In Kyllo v.
United States, law enforcement used a heat detection device to penetrate the walls of a
156

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).

157 Jones, 565 U.S. at 416-17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise

that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties
[because] [t]his approach is ill suited to the digital age . . . .”).
158
See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206 (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to cell phone geolocation tracking data because this data can reveal a great deal of PI).
159 See generally Miller, 435 U.S. at 440-43 (holding that an individual does not maintain a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to bank records).
160 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206.
161 Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (geolocation data may reveal “familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”); See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (the Court declined to
extend the third party doctrine because “[g]iven the unique nature of cell phone location records . . . when the
Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveillance . . . .”).
162 See, e.g., Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (holding that a warrantless breath test of an
intoxicated individual is reasonable, but a warrantless blood draw is an unreasonable search because blood
draws are significantly more intrusive); some scholars may not consider the level of intrusiveness as a
doctrine—hence, for this article, it is considered a general “principle” in the Court’s jurisprudence.
163 See, e.g., id.; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that a blood sample to test one’s blood
alcohol content is a search within the Fourth Amendment).
164 See supra note 161.
165
Id.
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home to “see” inside.166 While the device did not physically intrude into the individual’s
home, the technology enabled the law enforcement’s..167 Here, Kyllo would fall into
Quadrant III.
The fourth relevant doctrine is the common law trespass doctrine, which came before
Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy standard.168 In short, an individual
maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to her property. Historically,
the Court applied the Fourth Amendment’s protection and a person’s expectation of
privacy to physical property (e.g., an individual’s home).169 But today, an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy applies to the person, not just the person’s property.170
In Jones, the Government attached a GPS monitoring device to Jones’ automobile, and
the Court held, “[t]he Government usurped Jones’ property [and property interest in Jones’
automobile] for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him . . . .” 171 However, if Jones
consented to the GPS tracking, then Jones would not have had a reasonable expectation of
privacy.172 Justice Alito concurred in Jones, but he recognized the common-law trespass
doctrine and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard may be ineffective or
unworkable given the development and advancement of new technologies; electronic
surveillance does not physically intrude on a person’s property and individuals may relax
their expectations of privacy as a tradeoff with the convenience that new technologies
provide.173
Now, the question becomes how the Court determines the reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy (i.e., the objective point on the Continuum). Legal and constitutional
scholars recently identified certain principles and frameworks that the Court typically
applies to privacy claims.
An analysis of the more than forty Fourth Amendment cases from the Supreme
Court shows three emerging principles, for which the interaction between these principles
166

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 33-34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area,’ . . . constitutes a search” within the terms of the Fourth Amendment); PICADIO, supra note 124,
at 167.
168 Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 (“the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted
for, the common-law trespassory test.”).
169 See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438 (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable because, while
the Government wiretapped a phone, there was no physical entry into the home); Olmstead was later overturned
as the Supreme Court evolved the Fourth Amendment’s protections from a property-centric approach to a
person-centric approach.
170 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; See supra Part II.C and note 123 and accompanying text; Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (stating that the Supreme Court did not move away from the property-centric
approach to the Fourth Amendment protections, but rather, the Court extended the protections to the person
and their private conversations).
171 Jones, 565 U.S. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
172 See id. at 409 (“the specific question [in Knotts] was whether the installation [of a tracking beeper] ‘with
the consent of the original owner’ constitute[d] a search or seizure . . . [w]e held not.” (quoting United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984)).
173 Id. at 426-27 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s reliance on the law of trespass will present particularly
vexing problems in cases involving surveillance [because it] has traditionally required a physical touching of
property. . . New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and
many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.”).
167
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is key: (i) the intimacy of the place or thing targeted by the government (the “Intimacy
Principle”), (ii) the amount of information sought (the “Amount Principle”), and (iii) the
cost of the investigation (the “Cost Principle”).174
Regarding the Intimacy Principle, if the information sought is highly personal or
sensitive in nature, then the surveillance is more likely to infringe on an individual’s
privacy expectations.175 Like in Carpenter, where the Court determined the individual had
a reasonable expectation of privacy, the cell phone data was intimate because it revealed a
broad picture of the individual’s life—aligning with the intrusiveness principle.176 Here,
Carpenter maintained a higher subjective point on the Continuum, and the Court agreed
that the objective point aligned with Carpenter’s privacy expectations.
For the Amount Principle, the more extensive and longer in duration, the more likely
the surveillance will infringe on an individual’s privacy expectations.177 For example, the
Court determined that long-term monitoring of an individual’s automobile using a GPS
tracker infringed on the individual’s privacy expectations.178 And in Carpenter, the Court
stressed its concern regarding the dangers of collecting voluminous amounts of data.179
With respect to the Cost Principle, if the government can gather large amounts of data
at a relatively low cost, the surveillance is more likely to infringe on an individual’s privacy
expectations.180 In Jones, Justice Alito noted that low-cost surveillance techniques, which
are more prevalent given technological advancements, have eroded structural barriers that,
historically, made government surveillance difficult and costly.181 For instance, in
Carpenter, the cell phone data provided the government with intimate PI with little to no
effort and cost—the government simply asked the cell phone service provider for the
records.182
Carpenter provides the best example of the three principles and how these
principles interact. The government sought cell phone records that revealed detailed
location data over a long period of time (Intimacy Principle).183 These records were
voluminous (Amount Principle).184 And obtaining these records was of little to no cost to
the government (Cost Principle).185 While the Court does not explicitly frame its analysis
using these principles, in Carpenter and other cases, the Court applies or considers these
principles when analyzing the issue. These principles aid the Court in determining the
objective point on the Continuum.
TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 13 (Tokson does not name the three principles. I name the
principles for this article).
175 Id. at 15 (“The more intimate the place or thing targeted by the police for investigation, the more likely such
investigation is to infringe the privacy of the affected person or persons.”).
176 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18; supra note 161 and accompanying text.
177
TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 18.
178 Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations
of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”).
179 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18; TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 19 (“[The Court] repeatedly
emphasized the dangers that such a volume of data posed to a citizen’s privacy . . . .”).
180 TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 23.
181 Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring); TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 24.
182 See TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 25.
183 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2212.
184 Id. at 2209.
185
TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 25.
174
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But as Justice Alito recognized in Jones, technological advancements may erode
individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy.186 And while an on-point case has not
come before the Court, advancements in technologies may erode the privacy expectations
even if the facts are similar to Carpenter (i.e., intimate PI collected at mass volumes at a
relatively low cost). Why? Because an individual’s privacy expectations are a function of
what the individual knows and experiences.187 This “formula” can be shown as follows,
where EoP is the expectation of privacy, K is knowledge, and E is experience (“EoP
Formula”):
𝑬𝒐𝑷 = 𝒇(𝑲 + 𝑬)
For example, in United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the individual knowingly exposed PI (his IP address) when the individual
visited a website.188 More specifically, the court concluded that individuals “should know
that this information is . . . provided to [i]nternet service providers.”189 Here, the Court
considered knowledge (Forrester knew he disclosed the information) and experience
(individuals should know information is shared with internet service providers given their
experiences with websites).
The EoP Formula holds true when there is a lack of knowledge or a different set
of experiences. In a situation like Carpenter, it is not common knowledge for someone to
know the intimacy of the data collected in her cell phone records.190 With cell phone data,
courts have held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy because it is unlikely that
most people (i) know or should know the amounts of intimate data collected by cell phone
providers, and (ii) do not have sufficient personal experiences (e.g., working for a cell
phone service provider) to have such knowledge.191
Even if an individual holds a reasonable expectation of privacy, the individual’s
privacy expectations may be set aside if the government’s interest is sufficiently
compelling. Under the special needs doctrine, the government can demonstrate a “special
need” to justify a search where the individual has a reasonable privacy expectation.192 For
example, the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless drug tests as a condition of

See Jones, 565 U.S. at 429; TOKSON’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 150, at 23.
Tokson, Knowledge, supra note 151, at 149.
188 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007); Tokson, Knowledge, supra note 151, at 150.
189 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510 (9th Cir. 2007).
190 See Tokson, Knowledge, supra note 151, at 158-64 (explaining cell phone location information [or CSLI,
the same data at issue in Carpenter], a Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision held that it is unlikely that
individuals know cell phones and cell phone providers collect and store massive amounts of intimate data).
191 See generally id.
192 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663-65 (1995) (finding it lawful to drug test
student athletes where there was some evidence of athletes using marijuana because student athletes can be
role models to other students).
186
187
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employment193 or for participation in public school activities.194 And in Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives Ass’n, the Court upheld the drug testing program of railroad employees
because the government had a “special need” in identifying impaired performance that
could injure the passengers or the public.195 In short, the government’s role in protecting
public health and safety may be a sufficient justification for a suspicionless search under
the special needs doctrine, as the Court showed in Skinner.
From an economic rationale, the government’s interest in protecting public health and
safety may rest in the value of a human life, among other reasons. National Public Radio’s
Planet Money podcast explained the general rule that any federal safety regulation must
pass a cost-benefit test—if the costs of the regulation (e.g., money) exceed the benefits
(e.g., lives saved), the regulation is rejected.196 Historically, economists considered the cost
of death in the cost-benefit analysis.197 But today, economists consider the cost of death
plus the cost that individuals place on themselves for the value of their lives.198 Kip Viscusi,
a risk and uncertainty economist at Vanderbilt University, calculates the value of a
“statistical life” today to be $10 million.199
For perspective, Viscusi calculated the cost-benefit of shutting down the economy in
order to slow the spread of COVID-19; he assumed one million lives were saved from the
economic shutdowns,200 multiplied by the $10 million per statistical live, and he arrived at
$10 trillion as the “benefit” in the cost-benefit analysis.201 And considering $10 trillion is
approximately half of the United States GDP, this “benefit” estimate means that “in order
to justify completely opening businesses back up, the economy would need to lose half of
its value—" the basic and conservative calculation results in an extremely high cost if there
was not a shutdown.202
Here, with respect to COVID-19, the government’s compelling interest is saving
lives and protecting public health. Viscusi placed a dollar figure on how much the
government’s interest is in protecting the public health—it would cost $10 million in

See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 769 (1989) (holding that the government
had a sufficient “special need” when requiring applicants to take a drug test for federal employment positions);
See also Wendy Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for Health Information Privacy, 18 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 975, 1022-23 (describing the special needs doctrine).
194
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. V. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836-37
(2002) (holding that the school district had a sufficient “special need” in requiring students participating in
extracurricular activities to take a drug test); see also Mariner, supra note 193, at 1022-23.
195 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989).
196 Planet Money, Lives vs. The Economy, N AT’L PUB. RADIO, at 04:35 (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://one.npr.org/?sharedMediaId=835571843:858418568.
197
Id. at 05:13.
198 Id. at 10:12-12:05 (“[P]eople are putting a dollar value on their own lives all the time based on the jobs that
they do. How risky they are, and how much money they’re willing to accept, in wages, for those risky jobs.”).
199 Id. at 21:31 (Viscusi’s cost model takes the average cost across the entire labor market, considering factors
such as the likelihood of death on the job and how much extra money workers demand for that risk of death).
200 Id. at 22:00 (Viscusi used the one-million-lives-saved assumption because (i) President Donald Trump
publicly stated that one million lives were saved, and (ii) epidemiologists stated that it could be as high as two
million lives saved. Viscusi chose the conservative estimate).
201 Id. at 22:09 (the “benefit” is saving $10 trillion in the value of lives where the “cost” in the cost-benefit
analysis is the economic impact (e.g., the economic contraction) of the shutdowns).
202
Id. at 22:23 (emphasis added).
193

68

HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:1]

economic value for each life lost.203 Applying this figure to the privacy discussion, this
means that while individuals may have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
their PI and PHI, even during the pandemic, the government’s compelling interest (here,
demonstrated by the economics of “the value of life”) override or set aside privacy
protections. Further, given this compelling interest, individuals are more willing to share
their PI and PHI in the interest of public health.204 This marks a shift in privacy expectations
and the reasonableness of those expectations, which I turn to next.

C. The Shift in the Privacy Expectations and Reasonableness
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, PHI was generally considered private and protected,
and for the most part, PHI still is. 205 However, in only a few months’ time, the pandemic
shifted privacy expectations of PHI, and by doing so, the reasonableness of privacy
expectations. This Section C describes (i) the shift in privacy expectations, and (ii) the
newfound reasonable expectation of disclosure during the pandemic. For this section, this
article presumes that (i) the more sensitive a category of information is considered, the
more likely individuals desire to keep that category of information private, and (ii) the more
willing individuals are to share information, the less private individuals consider that
information to be.
Americans consistently and reliably considered their health data as one of the most
sensitive categories of data.206 Respondents to a 2014 survey rated health data as the second
highest category of information (the first being their social security numbers) with respect
to the privacy and sensitivity of the data.207 More than half of adults considered their health
data to be “very sensitive” in nature.208 Moreover, most adults consider their health data to
be just as sensitive as the content of their private phone conversations.209 Per these survey
responses, health data falls into Quadrants III or IV on the Continuum, depending on the
data’s specifics.
Similar levels of sensitivity apply to other types of information. Half of adults
consider their geolocation data to be very sensitive.210 And approximately 25% of adults
203

See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
Ghose, supra note 16, at 28.
205 See discussion supra Part II.A.
206 See Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Nov.
12,
2014),
https://www.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/9/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf (the survey was conducted
between January 10-27, 2014, with a sample size of 607 adults, all of whom were 18 years of age or older. A
total of 1,537 panelists were invited to respond, of which 935 responded, and 607 agreed to join the survey
panel. Four separate surveys regarding the “current issues, some of which relate to technology.” The sampling
error is ±4.6% at a 95% level of confidence); See also Gallup Org., Public Attitudes Toward Medical Privacy,
INST. FOR HEALTH FREEDOM (Sept. 2000) (detailing a survey from 2000 that shows similar levels of concern
regarding the privacy of health data. The survey is presented here to show that privacy concerns regarding
health data has remained relatively constant over time).
207 Id. at 7 (I use the term “healthcare data” for this article, but Pew Research Center described this type of
information as “state of your health and the medications you take” in the survey).
208 Id. at 32.
209 Id. at 33.
210
Id. at 34.
204
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consider their search history, religious views, political views, and who their friends are to
be considered very sensitive, while 8% of adults consider their purchasing habits very
sensitive.211
The COVID-19 pandemic shifted the willingness of individuals to share these sensitive
categories of information. As of April 2020, 84% of adults said that they would be more
willing to share their health data to combat the spread of COVID-19, and 58% of adults
said that they would be willing to share their geolocation data.212 Furthermore,
approximately two-thirds of adults stated that they would be willing to install an app on
their devices to help slow the spread of the pandemic, even if the app collected geolocation
and health data.213
In comparing the pre- and during-pandemic surveys, there is a shift in the willingness
to share data and information, which suggests individuals have lowered their sensitivity to
sharing their health data.214 This may be attributable to several factors, for which,
unfortunately, little to no data exists to confirm or invalidate.215 These factors could include
an individual’s self-interest in mitigating the effects of the pandemic (e.g., reopening
businesses), a sense of “doing their part” in combating the pandemic, a recognition of the
benefits in sharing the data, or a recognition of the level of risk associated with sharing the
data.216
Here, the pandemic shifted both the objective and subjective points on the Continuum.
The pre-pandemic survey responses suggest individuals would place their health data into
Quadrants III or IV (the subjective point). Recognizing a shift in privacy expectations has
occurred, to provide a possible explanation as to why this shift occurred, I turn back to the
three principles and the formula to determine the reasonableness of privacy expectations
(objective point).217
First, the Intimacy Principle remains constant for the health and geolocation data—
nothing changed regarding how intimate the data sets are for individuals prior to the
pandemic versus during the pandemic.218
Second, for the Amount Principle, this article assumes that the amount of health data
remains constant.219

211

Supra note 206, at 37.
Ghose, supra note 16, at 3.
213 Id.
214 It is difficult to determine whether the shift in willingness to share PHI is permanent because no postpandemic data exists. As of November 2020, the pandemic is ongoing.
215
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
216 These factors are speculative and non-exhaustive. Some factors may be temporary (i.e., only last during the
pandemic and may reverse an individual’s willingness to share their PHI post-pandemic) or permanent (i.e.,
continuing post-pandemic and have permanently changed an individual’s willingness to share their PHI). An
example of a temporary factor is the “doing their part” in combating the pandemic (once the pandemic ends,
there no need for an individual to “do their part” in combating the virus). A permanent factor could be the
recognition of the level of risk (an individual considering the sensitivity of her PHI is lower because she sees
more benefit than risk associated with sharing the data post-pandemic; the trade-off calculation changed).
217 See discussion supra Part II.B and note 151.
218 See id.
219
See id.
212
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Third, the Cost Principle may explain the shift.220 Here, the Cost Principle extends
beyond a monetary cost. The tradeoff calculation for individuals changed—a majority of
adults believe that preventing the spread of COVID-19 (benefit) is more important than
protecting people’s privacy with respect to their PHI (cost).221 In other words, individuals
see the increased benefit or reduced risk in sharing the data under a traditional cost-benefit
analysis. However, this calculation changes if the data is released publicly—duringpandemic survey data shows that 61% of adults are uncomfortable with public disclosure
of their PHI.222 This suggests there is still some expectation of privacy as individuals are
still uncomfortable with public disclosure, but a shift in those privacy expectations
occurred because most individuals rate the pandemic response as more important than
protecting people’s privacy. In other words, the objective point—what is reasonable to
society—has not shifted entirely to the left of the Continuum (no expectation of privacy).
If an individual were to claim the pre-pandemic privacy expectation with respect to her
health and geolocation data, it would likely be unreasonable because this shift occurred—
society, or at least a portion thereof, now believes disclosure of PHI to combat COVID-19
is beneficial.
Applying the EoP Formula, both knowledge and experience changed because of the
pandemic.223 Here, the individual’s personal knowledge changed; individuals know, or
should know, that geolocation data can and will likely be used for contact tracing purposes.
With the public attention COVID-19 has generated, society better understands what contact
tracing is, its value to combating the spread of COVID-19, and what data contact tracing
requires.224 And individuals have had experiences in combating the virus (e.g., wearing
masks, social distancing, etc.) and feeling the pandemic’s global impact (e.g., air travel
changes and interruptions, economic contractions, etc.). These changes—in individual
knowledge and experiences—provide an explanation for the change in individuals’ privacy
expectations; more individuals are willing to share their PHI given the pandemic.225
220

See id.

221 Grant Buckles, Americans Rank

Halting COVID-19 Spread Over Medical Privacy, GALLUP (May 15, 2020),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/311015/americans-rank-halting-covid-spread-medical-privacy.aspx (of those
surveyed, 39% responded that they would prioritize protecting people’s medical privacy over preventing the
spread of COVID-19, and 61% answered that they would prioritize the latter over the former).
222
Lucy Simko, et al., COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Privacy: Studying Opinion and Preferences 10, (May
8,
2020)
(Univ.
of
Wash.,
Working
Paper),
https://seclab.cs.washington.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/contact-tracing-user-privacy.pdf.
223 See supra Part II.B and note 187.
224 See, e.g., ED. BD., America Could Control the Pandemic by October. Let’s Get to It., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/08/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-response-testing-lockdown.html;
Benjamin Lesser, et al., Local Governments ‘Overwhelmed’ in Race to Trace U.S. COVID Contacts, REUTERS
(Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/health-coronavirus-tracing/; BUCKLES,
supra note 221; Chas Kissick, et al., What Ever Happened to Digital Contact Tracing?, LAWFARE (July 21,
2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ever-happened-digital-contact-tracing.
225 See Buckles, supra note 221 and accompanying text; See also Jennifer Steinhauer & Abby Goodnough,
Contact Tracing Is Failing in Many States. Here’s Why., N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/health/covid-contact-tracing-tests.html (contact tracing applications
have not been successfully deployed. The several factors that may explain why the United States has not
successfully deployed contact tracing include (i) the number of people, (ii) the delay in getting test results back,
and (iii) the wide community spread of COVID-19).
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Given this change in the privacy expectations of PHI, in certain situations,
individuals may have a reasonable expectation of disclosure.226 In certain situations,
individuals expect the disclosure of their PHI. Two situations where individuals are likely
to have a reasonable expectation of disclosure are: (i) for public health and safety purposes,
and (ii) for customer experience purposes associated with modern technology. Individuals
may expect their PHI data to be transmitted to public health authorities, contact tracing
applications, and the like for the reasons previously described.227 Further, individuals may
expect the sharing of their PHI between organizations because modern technology (e.g.,
user interface and experience design) have set expectations regarding the use, functionality,
and convenience of technology.228 For instance, individuals get frustrated if they must
answer the same medical-related questions repeatedly—they expect the PHI to be shared
to avoid the tedious repetition or friction in the customer experience.229
Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy standard is the basis for privacy
law—under both the Fourth Amendment and statutory protections, such as HIPAA.230
While not explicitly described by the Supreme Court, the Court considers several principles
that are generally used to establish whether a claimed infringement of an individual’s
privacy expectations is reasonable.231 While individuals and society reasonably expect their
PI and PHI to be private, the COVID-19 pandemic shifted those privacy expectations.232
To illustrate this shift, I turn to a case study in Part III.

IV. A CASE STUDY: THE PANDEMIC’S EFFECT ON THE LAW
Organizations that bring together large numbers of individuals (e.g., employers,
universities, etc.), in efforts to return to some level of normalcy and to protect individuals
whom they are responsible for, have implemented or are implementing various programs
and initiatives using health surveillance technology.233 For example, Ernst & Young and
the International Association of Privacy Professionals surveyed organizations to better
understand the pandemic’s impact and how organizations are responding to it from a
226

See generally Taylor, supra note 146, at 453.
See supra Part II.B (Intimacy, Amount, and Cost Principles and the EoP Formula).
228
See generally Taylor, supra note 146, at 453.
229 Id.
230 See supra Part II.A.
231 See supra Part II.B.
232 See supra Part II.C.
233 See, e.g., TRUSTARC PRIVACY INTELLIGENCE, Managing Employee Privacy in the Face of COVID-19,
TRUSTARC (Mar. 19, 2020), https://trustarc.com/blog/2020/03/19/managing-employee-privacy-in-the-face-ofcovid-19/ (describing inquiries it received regarding employee privacy matters); Philip Gordan, et al.,
Frequently Asked Questions on Workplace Privacy and COVID-19, LITTLER MENDELSON P.C. (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/frequently-asked-questions-workplace-privacy-andcovid-19 (discussing legal issues regarding PHI and employee privacy); Jenn Abelson, et al., At College Health
Centers, Students Battle Misdiagnoses and Inaccessible Care, WASH. POST (July 13, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/07/13/college-health-centers-problems/?arc404=true
(describing efforts that universities took or are taking); Letter from Doug McMillon, et al., Chairman, Bus.
Roundtable, to Vice President Michael R. Pence (Apr. 24, 2020), https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BusinessRoundtable-GuidelinesforReturningtoWork-2020.04.24.pdf (a letter from Fortune 500 chief executives
belonging to the Business Roundtable calling for national standards to protect workers and customers).
227
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privacy and security perspective.234 Over 50% of employers have collected some level of
PHI from their employees about symptoms, and 60% of organizations identified that they
are keeping records of employee diagnosed with COVID-19.235 Universities have been and
are at the forefront of the response—implementing health and safety initiatives for their
students, employees, and visitors.236
To better illustrate the shift in the privacy expectations with respect to PI and PHI, and
the reasonableness of those expectations, this Part III details the efforts by Arizona State
University (“ASU”) as a case study. I select ASU as a case study because (i) it is a public
institution that (ii) has three primary constituent groups—students, staff and faculty, and
visitors—each presenting a unique set of challenges. Part III is not intended to be an
exhaustive analysis of the legal or constitutional issues related to ASU’s initiatives or the
initiatives of other universities. Rather, Part III synthesizes the information presented in
Parts I and II regarding the technologies and the legal standards to present a better
understanding of how the rapidly emerging health surveillance technologies, traditional
jurisprudence, and legal standards interplay.
This Part III considers ASU’s contact tracing, case management, and health monitoring
platforms. I describe the technology ASU deployed, discuss the possible data supply chain
design, evaluate the data privacy and security risks, and apply the current legal standards
and jurisprudence.
Before the pandemic, ASU deployed and utilized an electronic health record system
and practice management system (“HRS/PMS”) from Point and Click Solutions, Inc.
(“PointNClick”) for its university-wide campus health services.237 At the start of the
pandemic, PointNClick added new features and capabilities to its platform to enable its
customers to respond to the global health emergency.238 For example, PointNClick added
a contact tracing feature that, if a student tests positive for COVID-19, the HRS/PMS will
automatically place the person in a contact tracing queue that will enable the university to
take additional actions to prevent an outbreak.239
For staff and faculty case management and contact tracing, ASU deployed
Salesforce.com’s Work.com solution (“Work”).240 Work’s contact tracing capability
234

See Müge Fazlioglu, Privacy in the Wake of COVID-19: Remote Work, Employee Health Monitoring and
Data Sharing, ERNST & YOUNG & INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (May 2020),
https://iapp.org/resources/article/iapp-ey-report-privacy-in-wake-of-covid19/ (the target population for the
survey included in-house privacy and IT professionals. Respondents were solicited via IAPP’s website, emails,
and social media accounts. Responses were collected between April 8-20, 2020, and 933 respondents
completed the survey).
235 Id. at iv.
236
See, e.g., Novel Coronavirus, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., https://eoss.asu.edu/health/announcements/coronavirus
(last visited Aug. 12, 2020); COVID-19 News & Resources, STAN. UNIV., https://healthalerts.stanford.edu/ (last
visited Aug. 12, 2020); COVID-19, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, https://coronavirus.utexas.edu/ (last visited Aug.
12, 2020); NYU Returns: 2020-2021 Academic Year, N.Y.U., https://www.nyu.edu/life/safety-healthwellness/coronavirus-information.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2020).
237 See, e.g., POINT AND CLICK SOLUTIONS, https://www.pointandclicksolutions.com/ (last visited Aug. 15,
2020).
238 COVID-19 Response, POINT AND CLICK SOLUTIONS, https://www.pointandclicksolutions.com/covid-19response (last visited Aug. 15, 2020).
239 Id.
240
See, e.g., WORK.COM, https://www.salesforce.com/work/?sfdc-redirect=219 (last visited Aug. 15, 2020).
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enables its customers to “manually trace interactions across employees, customers,
meetings, and locations to identify possible points of transmission.”241 Work allows people
managers to track their employees’ COVID-19 test results, symptoms, visited locations,
event attendance, etc., and it allows employees to track their own contacts via dashboard
visualizations (Figure 4).242

Figure 4: Work Dashboard Screenshot243

Furthermore, ASU’s University Technology Office embedded a white label health
monitoring platform, SAFE, into its mobile application (Figure 6).244 The university
requires all students, staff, and faculty to complete a daily health check, powered by SAFE,
using the ASU mobile application; the daily health check asks whether the individual is
experiencing any symptoms or has come in contact with anyone who has experienced
symptoms of COVID-19.245 Failure to complete the daily health checks may result in the
suspension of access to university systems, tools, and resources.246

241

Protect
Your
Workforce
with
Manual
Contact
Tracing
Solutions,
WORK.COM,
https://www.salesforce.com/products/contact-tracing/overview/?d=cta-body-promo-112 (last visited Aug. 12,
2020).
242
Salesforce.com,
Work.com
Demo,
SALESFORCE.COM
(Aug.
15,
2020),
https://www.salesforce.com/form/contact-tracing/demo/?d=cta-header-90.
243 Id. at 0:19.
244 See Part I.A.; See also SAFE HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., supra note 35 and accompanying text. Individuals can
also complete the daily health checks via an ASU web application or by phone, Mark S. Searle, Required Daily
Health Check, ASU HEALTH SRVCS (Aug. 11, 2020), https://eoss.asu.edu/health/announcements/coronavirus.
245 Searle, supra note 244.
246
Id.
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Figure 6: SAFE Embedded into ASU’s Mobile Application

The three platforms, PointNClick, Work, and SAFE integrate with other ASU systems
and tools.247 These integrations require the transmission of PI or PHI between them for
proper functionality. Both PointNClick and Work require individuals—students, staff, and
faculty—to provide PI, such as locations visited; this is user-inputted data. SAFE, via the
ASU mobile application, requires individuals to provide PHI—symptom information; this
is also user-inputted data.
For queried data, ASU sources data from both internal and external parties. ASU
sources internal data from other systems and tools to enable the platforms.248 For
information security purposes, ASU sources IP-data from external data suppliers for
identity verification.249 Moreover, ASU’s systems and tools will autogenerate PI that is
used across the network of systems and tools for various purposes, such as information
security and campus safety.250
247

See, e.g., Christine L. Borgman, Open Data, Grey Data, and Stewardship: Universities at the Privacy
Frontier, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 365, 368 (2018) (“As universities outsource more computing systems and
services . . . they relinquish . . . control.” I make certain assumptions regarding the integration of systems and
tools for this article. These assumptions are based on professional knowledge of information technology
systems and tools, including information security best practices and processes); for example, both systems
integrate with ASU’s single-sign-on (“SSO”). The SSO data is transmitted between ASU systems and tools to
authenticate the user’s identity. A more thorough description of ASU’s system and tool integrations are out of
scope for this article.
248 E.g., ASU’s student records management system transmits a student’s educational program to determine if
the student is an on-campus or online student. On-campus students must complete the daily health check.
249 E.g., ASU sources the geolocation of a user’s IP address to determine whether the individual seeking access
to the network is truly the owner of the credentials used to login to the system or tool.
250 E.g., ASU will autogenerate a login register—tracking where, when, and for how long a user is logged into
a system.
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SAFE requires user-inputted data. But while PointNClick and Work were
deployed for contact tracing purposes, these systems require more than the user-inputted
data. Considering the totality of the PI and PHI collected, stored, and used by ASU, whether
user-inputted, queried, or autogenerated data, there are two risks worth detailing: the risk
of (i) a data breach, and (ii) function creep.
ASU, and likely every university, is at risk for a data breach because it collects,
stores, and uses vast amounts of PI, PHI, and other data.251 Universities are the third highest
sector for data breaches in the United States because they maintain in-depth and diverse
data sets regarding its students, staff, faculty, and research.252 They have already seen statesponsored cyberattacks—China sponsored a cyberattack against American universities in
an attempt to steal intellectual property and research related to the pandemic.253 In April
2019, hackers stole PI of students, staff, and faculty from Georgia Institute of Technology,
and in 2017, Washington State University was breached and 1.1 million individuals’ PHI
was compromised.254 The pandemic-related increase in the collection, storage, and use of
PI and PHI and the rapid deployment of the technologies have increased the data breach
risk.
But the risks extend beyond data breaches and the theft of PI and PHI for
individuals. PointNClick, Work, and SAFE collect PI and PHI that was not previously
collected by ASU—contacts, events attended, daily symptom checks, COVID-19 status,
etc. While ASU may not retain the data indefinitely, other organizations deploying similar
efforts may, and considering the likelihood that the data will be retained by the organization
after the pandemic, the potential for misuse and abuse multiplies when the organization
aggregates the data and applies ML/AI to the data sets.255 For example, while the data is
collected for the health monitoring of students, staff, and faculty, the data could be used
for university research purposes.256
Under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and normal circumstances, this data
collection and usage would be unlawful or unconstitutional. While these platforms do not
automatically collect geolocation data, like in Carpenter and Riley, the intimacy and
amount of data (geolocation and health monitoring PI and PHI) would make the data
collection and usage initiatives unconstitutional because “it [would] achieve near perfect
surveillance.”257 If an automated geolocation feature were activated on SAFE, for example,
the contact tracing data would reveal highly sensitive information about ASU’s students,
staff, and faculty because it would generate “a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s

251

See Borgman, supra note 247, at 368.
Id. at 405.
253 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima & Devlin Barrett, U.S. Accuses China of Sponsoring Criminal Hackers Targeting
Coronavirus Vaccine Research, WASH. POST (July 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/us-china-covid-19-vaccine-research/2020/07/21/8b6ca0c0-cb58-11ea-91f128aca4d833a0_story.html.
254 10,000 Breaches Later: Top Five Education Data Breaches, I DENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. (Aug. 17, 2020,
7:04 PM), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/10000-breaches-later-top-five-education-data-breaches/.
255 See Borgman, supra note 247, at 401.
256 Borgman, supra note 247, at 400-01.
257
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
252
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public movements”, similar to the comprehensive GPS monitoring that occurred in
Jones.258
But in the age of COVID-19, this data collection and usage should not surprise
students, staff, and faculty. While ASU has communicated its objectives with respect to
PointNClick, Work, and SAFE to students, staff, and faculty, privacy expectations remain,
albeit these expectations shifted since the start of the pandemic. Before the pandemic,
students, staff, and faculty likely would have been concerned with the university’s data
collection because survey data suggests the overall privacy concerns of health data.259
Before the pandemic, the objective and subjective points on the Continuum likely would
have been in Quadrants III or IV, but the pandemic shifted these points to Quadrant II.
Individuals have lower subjective privacy expectations.260 And given the knowledge of and
experience with the pandemic, the objective point—the reasonableness of privacy
expectations—is lower. If an individual were to claim a higher expectation of privacy on
the Continuum—a subjective point in Quadrant III or IV—with respect to her pandemicrelated PHI, such expectations would now be unreasonable because the reasonable person
has a lower privacy expectation.261
Regardless of where the objective and subjective points fall on the Continuum, the
compelling government interest in protecting the public health and safety would set aside
the privacy expectations under the special needs doctrine.262 ASU, as a public university,
is subject to the Fourth Amendment as a public actor, and like in Skinner, where the drug
testing program’s intent was to protect public safety, ASU’s COVID-19 programs have the
same intent. Moreover, under HIPAA, ASU, as both a covered entity and a business
associate, could invoke the public health exemptions.263
The special needs doctrine would also apply to any common law trespass claim under
the Fourth Amendment. Under the common law trespass doctrine, an individual could
claim a Fourth Amendment violation because the university effectively requires students,
staff, and faculty to download the ASU mobile application to their personal phones.264 By
effectively forcing the download and installation of a health monitoring application onto
one’s personal property, ASU would be unconstitutionally conducting a search via its
monitoring. While the claim would have merit under normal circumstances, during the
pandemic, the special needs doctrine would set this claim aside, even without considering
the subjective and objective points on the Continuum.
For public actors, like universities, contact tracing and health monitoring applications
and platforms pose privacy and security risks for individuals. Despite the risks of function
creep and data breaches, these applications and platforms are lawful and constitutional
258
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because the pandemic shifted privacy expectations and the reasonableness of those
expectations—the subjective and objective points on the Continuum. Moreover, they are
lawful and constitutional under the government’s compelling interest in protecting the
public health and safety.
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V. THE INEFFECTIVENESS AND UNWORKABILITY OF THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY STANDARD AND RECLAIMING THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY
The pandemic revealed the ineffectiveness and unworkability of the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard. The shift in the objective and subjective points on the
Continuum show that privacy expectations are not constant—they change over time and in
response to personal and societal experiences and knowledge. This is one of two faults with
the reasonable expectation of privacy standard; it presumes that privacy expectations
remain constant over time, and that a reasonable person maintains a well-informed and
development set of privacy expectations.265 But the need for privacy is constant.
Section A explains the faults and why the standard will not protect individuals’ data
privacy and security. And Section B proposes a new legal standard that would protect data
privacy and security regardless of shifting expectations.

A. The Ineffective and Unworkable Katz Standard
The COVID-19 pandemic illustrated the ineffectiveness and unworkability of the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. The shift in the objective and subjective points
on the Continuum show that privacy expectations are not constant—they change over time.
Yet, the need for privacy does not disappear. Moreover, there are two faults with the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard: it presumes that (i) privacy expectations remain
relatively constant over time, and (ii) a reasonable person maintains a well-informed and
developed set of privacy expectations.266 This Section A explains these faults and why the
standard will not protect individuals’ data privacy and security over time.
The need for privacy is constant. Even though the subjective and objective points
shifted, the risks associated with the unauthorized access, use, or dissemination of PI and
PHI have not changed since the pandemic began. For instance, the pandemic did not
suddenly change the risks associated with unauthorized use of one’s geolocation data—
malicious actors prior to and during the pandemic can use the geolocation data to identify
one’s social connections, political affiliations, and the like.267 The need for privacy remains
constant because the inherent value of PI and PHI to the individual is unchanged—the
value of one’s PHI did not change with the onset of the pandemic.
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard does not incorporate the values and
risks of PI and PHI. The reduction of subjective privacy expectations given the pandemic,
under the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, any unauthorized or malicious
access, use, or dissemination of PI or PHI may not result in a privacy violation or
infringement in the eyes of the law.268 In Carpenter, intimate cell phone location data was
considered so private that obtaining such data requires a warrant by law enforcement.269
265
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The shift in the objective point on the Continuum, the same intimate data collected and
used for contact tracing may not be considered as sensitive as it was in Carpenter. But it is
the exact same data.
Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan recognized the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard assumes stability in privacy expectations; in Jones, the concurrence stated
that the reasonable expectation of privacy standard is flawed because it “rests on the
assumption that this hypothetical person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy
expectations.”270 But the pandemic introduced instability—the objective and subjective
points shifted.
As technology advances, privacy expectations change—leading to significant changes
in “popular attitudes” regarding privacy.271 The prevailing “popular attitude” may differ
from person to person—this shows the fault in that the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard presumes a well-informed set of privacy expectations. Judges are apt to confuse
their own privacy expectations with those of the reasonable person under Katz.272 Judges
may have different knowledge and sets of experiences that shape their placement of the
objective point on the Continuum. Since the reasonable expectation of privacy is a function
of knowledge and experience, what is knowledgeable to a well-educated judge is
significantly different than the ordinary person.273
This prompts the question as to whether the reasonable expectation of privacy will
diminish to a point where there is no expectation of privacy. Likely not, but nonetheless,
the value and risks remain. Accordingly, the need for privacy protections remain. This calls
for a new legal standard—the right to control.

B. Reclaiming the Right to Privacy with a New Legal Standard and
Legislative Action
There are two priorities to reclaim the right to data privacy and security. The first is to
replace the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz with a more robust standard.
The second is comprehensive forward-thinking data privacy and security legislation from
Congress. This Section B proposes a new standard—the right to control—to replace the
ineffective and unworkable reasonable expectation of privacy standard. Further, this
section implores Congress to enact comprehensive data privacy and security legislation to
protect individuals, their PI, and their PHI.
The right to control would be the effective and workable standard to replace the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. It would ask whether an individual’s right to
control his data, its privacy, and its security was violated or infringed.
Unlike the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, where objective and subjective
privacy expectations may wane over time, the right to control standard would not weaken
when privacy expectations shift because the standard relies on tangible control, not
intangible and fluctuating expectations. As Justice Alito said in Jones, the reasonable
270
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expectation of privacy standard presumes stability, but under a right to control standard,
stability would be a non-issue because an individual gets to determine the control of her
own data.274 The reasonable expectation of privacy considers the external factors—what
are the reasonable expectations of privacy of an objective person—where knowledge and
experience weigh heavily on the determination. The right to control standard would not
consider these external factors because it would be solely dependent on whether the
individual’s right to control his data was infringed. The right to control would be an
affirmative civil right not subject to the reasonable person objective standard.
Further, the right to control standard incorporates and appreciates the inherent value of
the PI or PHI—individuals get to control their data based on the value they place on their
information. For example, as previously mentioned, individuals may have different levels
of sensitivity regarding their sexual history—some would place their sexual history on
Quadrant IV and others would place it in Quadrant II or III on the Continuum.275 Under the
right to control standard, the individual reclaims the right to determine where a category of
her data falls on the Continuum for herself unlike under the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard where the data collector makes the determination subject to any
constitutional or statutory protections.
Changing the standard is necessary, but not sufficient in comprehensively
protecting individuals’ PI and PHI. Congress must pass comprehensive data privacy and
security legislation. Congress recognizes the need to do so. Prior to and during the
pandemic, members of Congress proposed various data privacy and security bills. 276 But
these privacy and security bills fail to gain traction in Congress.277
Congress cannot turn to the industry to self-regulate or provide proposals for data
privacy and security legislation for two reasons. First, as idealistic companies age,
companies exchange governmental regulation for governmental protection. For instance,
with Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg invites government regulation because such regulation
would protect Facebook’s monopoly on social media.278 This is no different than Theodore
Vail, the former president of AT&T, submitting to government regulation in the 1910s that
allowed AT&T to dominate for decades.279
Second, while organizations may self-regulate, the number of high-profile data privacy
lapses and data breaches show a private market failure.280 The fundamental issue with selfregulation is the conflict of interest that exists—the regulators are the regulated.281 Here,
274
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actually protecting individuals’ PI and PHI by improving privacy and security practices
(e.g., prohibiting the processing and dissemination of data) conflicts with the regulators’
(the organizations themselves) source of revenue.282 More simply, it is counterintuitive for
organizations to improve their privacy and security capabilities if the improvements
negatively impact their revenue and profits.283
Therefore, Congress needs to act comprehensively. While this article does not
exhaustively list all of the rights, protections, and obligations that must be created with
Congressional action, the legislation should preempt the states to prevent a patchwork of
varying levels of protection.284 It must include a private right of action that will allow
individuals to seek redress, but the private right of action should be limited by procedural
filters, such as an opportunity to cure an alleged violation, to avoid unnecessary and
meritless litigation.285 And the legislation should be data-subject-centric—meaning that the
drafting must protect individuals and their data, not an organization’s revenue or profits. A
data-subject-centric approach can be achieved by establishing duties of loyalty and care
onto organizations for the benefit of individuals.286 Lastly, the legislation must recognize
the three types of data (user-inputted, queried, and autogenerated) and data supply chains
to effectively provide data privacy and security protections end-to-end.
By changing the legal standard from the reasonable expectation of privacy to the right
to control, individuals reclaim data privacy and security. Congress must act in passing
comprehensive data privacy, and security legislation to create effective and necessary
protections because the need for personal privacy and security is always present.
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CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has thrusted health surveillance technologies into the
spotlight, and with the technologies, the data privacy and security issues that come with
them. The collection, use, and dissemination of PI and PHI is necessary to combat the virus
and slow the spread. But as organizations move to deploy these technologies, we must
consider the types of data and existence of data supply chains to fully understand the
totality of privacy and security risks.
With the totality of understanding, we can evaluate the effectiveness and workability
of current legal standards and protections. The pandemic revealed the ineffectiveness and
unworkability of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard because the objective and
subjective points on the Continuum shifted. To truly protect individuals’ data privacy and
security, the legal standard must change to a right to control, and Congress must act to pass
comprehensive data privacy and security legislation because “invasions upon [an
individual’s] privacy, subject [the individual] to mental pain and distress, far greater than
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”287
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